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Abstract: This dissertation adds to the body of literature that examines the use of housing equity 
by retirees.  The Life-Cycle Hypothesis suggests that households save during their working years 
and then draw down those savings in retirement.  Housing equity constitutes a large portion of 
most retiree’s savings portfolios, yet older households are not using their accumulated housing 
equity to help increase consumption in retirement and often die with large sums of housing 
equity.  This dissertation explores housing equity use by older Americas in three ways.  Chapter 
1 looks at homeownership and moving rates of older Americans and how having a guaranteed 
source of income from a defined benefit plan may have mitigated some of the effects of the 
Great Recession.  Specifically, I find that households with defined contribution plans were 2-2.8 
percent less likely to be homeowners after the Great Recession compared to those with a defined 
benefit plan.  This provides evidence that the guaranteed income from a defined benefit plan may 
be a reason why households historically have not used the equity of their house in retirement.  
Thus, future households who do not have a defined benefit plan may be more willing to use their 
equity in order to maintain levels of consumption as they age.  Chapter 2 investigates how a 
potential increase in out-of-pocket medical spending for older households may cause them to 
engage in precautionary using their home.  This chapter suggests that if there were more 
adequate health insurance for seniors, then as many as 13 percent of households would be willing 
to forgo owning a home in their 70s, which would allow them to use their equity to help finance 
consumption in retirement.  Chapter 3 concludes this dissertation by exploring how forgoing 
time and money spent on home maintenance allows older households to extract housing equity.  I 
show that households disinvest as much as $43,000 between the ages of 65-84, which could lead 
to an additional $2,150 per year to be spent elsewhere.  I also look at how this level of 
disinvestment compares to other forms of housing equity extraction such as reverse mortgages 
and moving. 
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 The Life-Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) suggests that households plan their income and 
savings throughout their lifetime by saving during their working years and then living off of 
those savings plus accumulated return in retirement (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954).  Many 
households do not always behave as the LCH would suggest.  One such way is the use of 
housing equity in retirement. According to the US Census Bureau, nearly 80 percent of retirees 
own a house and housing equity accounts for nearly half the net worth of retired Americans 
(Moulton et al. 2016).  With housing equity making up such a large portion of many Americans 
savings portfolios, the LCH suggests that retirees would extract this equity to help increase 
consumption in retirement.  Homeowners can extract housing equity by downsizing, moving 
from owning to renting, or taking out a reverse mortgage.  However, there is little evidence that 
households have historically behaved this way and often die with large amounts of housing 
equity.(Poterba, Venti, and Wise 2011; Venti and Wise 1989, 1990, 2001, 2004; Ai et al. 1990; 
Feinstein and McFadden 1989; Fisher et al. 2007).  Less than 10 percent of homeowners move 
each year, and those that do are just as likely to upsize their home as they are to downsize (Venti 
and Wise 1989, 2001, 2004; Feinstein and McFadden 1989).  Most households seem to want to 
remain in their home during retirement, yet, they do not extract equity through a reverse 
mortgage.  Only around 2 percent of retirees possess a reverse mortgage and households often 
are not aware of them or what they entail (Nakajima and Telyukova 2017; Davidoff, Gerhard, 
and Post 2017; Kutty 1998).   
 One of the more intuitive explanations for why retirees are not using their housing equity 
to increase consumption is their intention to leave their house as a bequest to their children.  
However, previous research has shown that this is a poor explanation as most homeowners do 
not behave in a manner consistent with leaving the house as a bequest (Hurd 1992; Venti and 
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Wise 1989; Hoynes and McFadden 1997).  The chapters in this dissertation build on prior 
research analyzing how older Americans are (or are not) using their housing equity to increase 
consumption in retirement. 
 In Chapter 1 I analyze how the Great Recession affected homeownership and moving 
rates for households that had a guaranteed source of income from a defined benefit plan 
compared to households that had a defined contribution plan.  Using a difference-in-difference 
analysis, I find that households with a defined contribution plan were 2.1-2.9 percent less likely 
to own a home following the Great Recession.  This was largely concentrated in urban 
households and households that had at least one person working.  The results found in this 
chapter are important to help future generations of retirees understand the changing role of home 
equity in retirement planning as future retirees. 
 In Chapter 2 I use a heterogeneous overlapping generations model to determine if 
households are not using their housing equity because they are engaging in precautionary 
savings, where they would sell their home to pay of potential increases in medical bills in their 
late retirement years.  I find that if households knew they would not have to pay out-of-pocket 
medical expenses from a health shock, there would be a 13-percentage point decrease in the 
number households who own a home indicating they would be willing to forgo owning a home 
in favor of renting. I show some households are engaging in precautionary savings and with 
more adequate health insurance, these retirees would be more willing to act as expected per the 
LCH regarding downsizing and moving. 
 The fist two chapters explore reasons why homeowners are not extracting equity by 
moving; however, it appears that a majority homeowners want to remain in their home during 
retirement (Venti and Wise 2004; Munnell, Soto, and Aubry 2007).  In Chapter 3 I investigate 
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how older homeowners who choose to stay in their home may be extracting equity by forgoing 
investment in home maintenance.  Aguiar and Hurst (2005) show that retirees offset a decrease 
in food expenditure with an increase in time spent at home on food preparation.  I find that a 
similar model with spending on home maintenance does not follow this pattern.  I show the 
importance of including time spent on home maintenance in studies of this nature and that 
households decrease both time and spending on home maintenance.  Households over age 75 
invest between $1,388-$1,999 less per year and see their homes appreciate 1.5-1.9 percent 
slower each year than households between the ages of 50 and 74.  While it does appear that 
households are extracting some equity as they age by forgoing home maintenance.  I also show 
that households could extract higher amounts of equity by taking out a reverse mortgage. 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to further understand the choices of older Americas 
regarding their use of housing equity.  The findings shown in this dissertation help understand 
these choices.  This information will help individuals make more informed financial decisions as 
the plan and prepare for retirement.  It will also help policymakers in crafting policy for the 21st 
century.   
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Defined Benefit Pensions and Homeownership in the Post-Great Recession 
Era 
Abstract: While housing equity accounts for a large portion of many retiree’s savings portfolios, 
they are not using their equity to increase consumption in retirement as suggested by the Life-
Cycle Hypothesis.  Defined benefit plans provide a guaranteed source of income in retirement 
where the household bears no risk, whereas households with a defined contribution plan are subject 
to potential risk depending on their asset allocation.  This paper examines whether having a defined 
benefit plan mitigated some of the effects of the Great Recession.  Using a difference-in-difference 
analysis, I examine the impact of the Great Recession on homeownership between households with 
a defined benefit plan compared to those with a defined contribution plan.  I find that households 
with a defined contribution plan were 2.1-2.9 percent less likely to own a home after the Great 
Recession compared to households with a defined contribution plan.  It is possible that households 
with defined contribution plans were willing to forgo homeownership to offset some of the losses 
experienced from the Great Recession.  Future retirees face a potentially risker housing market 
and are less likely to have a defined benefit plan.  As a result, future retirees may be more willing 






















 Owning a house has historically been a viewed as a safe investment receiving an average 
rate of return around 5 percent per year (S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC).  While it does not 
receive a rate of return as high as the stock market (over 7% seen in the S&P 500 (Yahoo 
Finance)), there has been relatively low volatility in housing prices, which have tended to 
increase each year.  As a result, nearly 80 percent of retirees own a house according the US 
Census Bureau (2018) and housing equity accounts for nearly half the net worth of retired 
Americans (Moulton et al. 2016).  The Great Recession of 2007-2009 was one of the most severe 
economic downturns in American history and was unique among recent recessions due to 
simultaneous shocks in the labor, stock, and housing markets.  During the recession, the S&P 
500 averaged a 2.3 percent monthly decline (Yahoo Finance), unemployment rose from 5.0 
percent to 9.5 percent (US Bureau of Labor Statistics), and the Case-Shiller Index averaged a 9.1 
percent decline (S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC).  Many older Americans (age 55 and older) saw a 
decline in home value simultaneous with a reduction in their retirement portfolios or income for 
those still working. 
 The Life-Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) suggests that households plan their consumption and 
savings paths throughout their lifetime by saving throughout their working years and then living 
off those savings plus return in retirement (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954).  Because housing 
equity constitutes a large part of a many retiree’s savings portfolios, the LCH suggest that they 
should use their accumulated housing equity to increase consumption in retirement.  However, 
prior to the Great Recession this was not usually the case, as many households die while still 
owning large positive housing equity1 (Borsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou, and Kotlikoff 1992; Ai et 
                                                          
1 Section 2 provides background information on the housing-equity puzzle. 
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al. 1990; Feinstein and McFadden 1989; Fisher et al. 2007; Poterba, Venti, and Wise 2011; Venti 
and Wise 1989, 1990, 2001, 2004).  With house values declining during the Great Recession, it 
is possible home ownership is no longer seen as the safe investment it once was and some 
households may choose to store their wealth elsewhere.   
Over the last 30 years, American employers have shifted away from defined benefit plans 
in favor of defined contribution plans (Butrica et al. 2009; Hurd and Rohwedder 2010).  Defined 
benefit plans are managed by the employer, who bear all the risk, and provide a guaranteed 
source of income in retirement for the remainder of the employee’s life based on years of 
service2.  Defined contribution plans – such as an employee sponsored 401(k) or 403(b) – are 
managed by the employee, who bears all the risk, and receive contributions from the employer.  
Defined contribution plans often carry more risk than defined benefit plans as they are sensitive 
to the portfolio and asset allocations the employee makes (Poterba et al. 2006).  Thus, without 
the guaranteed income provided by a defined benefit plan, older (for the purpose of this paper, 
those age 55+ and in their late working years) and retired households (generally age 65+) were 
subject to greater losses in savings and wealth during the Great Recession.  In this paper, I 
explore the role of defined benefit plans in homeownership after the Great Recession.  
Specifically, I examine whether households that had a defined contribution plan were willing to 
extract housing equity by foregoing homeownership and opting to rent instead, to offset some of 
these losses.  Using the Health and Retirement Study, I analyze how homeownership rates have 
changed since the Great Recession based on age and pension status.  Because the Great 
                                                          
2 Defined benefit plans vary in terms from employer to employer as to how much income they get, when 




Recession had a varying impact for different regions of the country, I also analyze 
homeownership rates for households in urban and rural areas. 
 I find that while all households saw losses in non-housing related wealth following the 
recession, households with a defined contribution plans saw a significant decrease in 
homeownership rates compared to those that had a defined benefit plan.  A difference-in-
difference analysis shows households with defined contribution plans were 2.1-2.9 percent less 
likely to own a home following the Great Recession compared to households with a defined 
benefit plan, which saw little or no change in homeownership.  I find this change to be largely 
concentrated in households where at least one person is working and residing in urban 
households, as homeownership rates of rural households appear to not be affected by the Great 
Recession. 
 Results of this study suggest that households with a defined contribution plan were less 
likely to own a home after the Great Recession compared to households with a defined benefit 
plan, who had a guaranteed income.  While other explanations cannot be entirely ruled out, it is 
possible these households chose to reconsider the role the house played in their savings portfolio 
as more older households with defined contribution plans were more likely to act as would be 
expected per the LCH.  This is important because households under age 65 are significantly less 
likely to have a defined benefit plan than older retirees.  The decline housing values during the 
Great Recession indicate that they may not behave as they did in past decades, and that housing 
equity may indeed carry some risk.  Future retirees will be increasingly likely to have large parts 
of their savings portfolios in risky assets without the guaranteed income from a defined benefit 
plan.  The results of this paper are important to help future generations of retirees understand the 
changing role of home equity in retirement planning so that they may act accordingly. These 
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results also help policymakers understand the changing dynamics of retirees’ savings decisions 
and will help shape policy for the 21st century. 
 My findings make several contributions to the literature on the use of housing equity as 
households age. First, it provides an in-depth analysis of home ownership and transition rates for 
older Americans in the post-Great Recession era.  This complements earlier studies done by 
Feinstein and McFadden (1989), Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2011), Venti and Wise (1989, 1990, 
2001, 2004), and others.  Second, this is one of the first papers to analyze the impact of pension 
plans on homeownership after the Great Recession.  It provides new insights into how a defined 
benefit plan may influence how older Americans use their housing equity in retirement – 
something not observed before the Great Recession. 
 The next section proceeds with a discussion on the use of housing equity by older 
Americans in Section 2; Section 3 provides a description of the data and weighting; Section 4 
discusses wealth, homeownership, and moving rates of older Americans before after the Great 
Recession; Section 5 lays out the empirical strategy used in this paper; Section 6 presents and 
discusses the results; Section 7 offers sensitivity analysis and robustness checks; and Section 8 
offers concluding remarks.  
2. The Use of Housing Equity by Older Americans 
 The LCH suggests that households should extract their housing equity in retirement to 
supplement their savings and social security to help increase consumption spending.  Households 
can achieve this in one of three ways: downsizing to a smaller home, moving from owning to 
renting, or taking out a reverse mortgage.  In fact, households over age 65 could increase their 
median income by as much as 40 percent if they sold their home and annuitized the money from 
the sale (Butrica and Mudrazija 2016).  However, historically only around 2-9 percent of 
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homeowners move in a given year (Feinstein and McFadden 1989; Venti and Wise 2001, 2004, 
1989).  Since so many homeowners stay in their home, a reverse mortgage is an option that 
allows them to extract housing equity without moving, however only around 2 percent of retirees 
possess a reverse mortgage (Nakajima and Telyukova 2017; National Retirement Risk Index 
2010).  Some research suggests households do not appear to be aware of reverse mortgages or 
what they entail (Davidoff, Gerhard, and Post 2017; Kutty 1998; Venti and Wise 1990, 2004).  
Since the LCH indicates that homeowners should want to use their housing equity, an effort has 
been made to understand why many do not.  Some possible reasons include bequests, 
precautionary savings, and non-economic reasons. 
Past research has suggested that households may choose to forgo using equity in the 
house in order to leave it as a bequest (Feinstein and McFadden 1989; Hurd 1992).  However, 
Hurd (1992) found no evidence to support a bequest motive because the consumption and 
savings paths are almost identical for homeowners who are parents and nonparents.  He suggests 
that if there was a bequest motive then there should be a higher savings path for parents than 
nonparents, which was not the case.  Venti and Wise (1989) also noted that the change in 
housing equity is the same for older homeowners regardless of parental status, suggesting that a 
bequest is not the main explanation for reluctance to use housing equity.  Fisher et al. (2007) 
noted that if bequests were the motive, older Americans might treat their home as another part of 
their total financial portfolio, however, Hoynes and McFadden (1997) show that as house value 
increases, household total savings do not.  Despite its intuitive appeal, there is no strong evidence 




 Another possible explanation is that older Americans treat their house as a form of 
precautionary savings in the event of unexpected medical costs (Poterba, Venti, and Wise 2011; 
Venti and Wise 2001; Nakajima and Telyukova 2017).  One of the biggest consumption 
expenditures of older Americans is long-term care.  Given the uncertainty of if or when long-
term care will become necessary, the house can serve as a form of precautionary savings to serve 
as a form of insurance to provide funds if needed (Fisher et al. 2007).  Murray (2018) explores 
this explanation and finds that precautionary savings indeed accounts for up to 13 percent of 
households holding on to their housing equity. 
 A final theory is that as people age, they are less likely to view the house as an asset.  
Socioemotional Selective Theory (SST) is a lifespan theory of motivation popular in psychology 
that proposes that people monitor time horizons and adjust motivations, goals, and preferences as 
they age.  Older people are more likely to perceive time as finite.  Thus, they may place more 
importance on finding emotional meaning and satisfaction from life while investing fewer 
resources into gathering information and expanding horizons (Carstensen 2006).  Fisher et al. 
(2007) noted that if this is the case, older Americans may hold on to their home because they are 
more driven by emotional attachment than financial gain.  However, a reverse mortgage would 
allow a household to remain in their home and extract equity and satisfy both the LCH and SST. 
 In this paper, I explore an alternative explanation that was not observed prior to the Great 
Recession.  Defined benefit plans are less common for recent retirees and those who are about to 
retire compared to older generations on whom many previous studies were conducted.  In 
addition, the coinciding losses in wealth and house value during the Great Recession provides a 
unique opportunity to examine how having the guaranteed income from a defined benefit plan 
may have mitigated these losses compared to other households.  The potential willingness of 
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some households with a defined contribution plan to part with their housing equity after the 
Great Recession shows how a defined benefit plan may have influenced the historical decision of 
so many older Americans to not use their housing equity to increase consumption in retirement.  
It is possible that due to having a guaranteed source of income from a defined benefit plan, 
households never considered the house when making retirement decisions.  Households with 
defined contribution plans in a potentially risker housing market may be more willing to do so.  
3. Data and Weighting 
  
A. Data 
This paper uses individual and household level data from eight waves of the restricted 
version of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) from 1998-2014 to study homeownership 
before and after the Great Recession.  The HRS is a longitudinal survey that includes about 
20,000 households over age 50, representative of the overall United States population in that age 
group.  The HRS defines an observational unit as an eligible household containing at least one 
person born within a given time period (which varies by phase)3. The HRS is administered by the 
University of Michigan Institute for Social Research in partnership with the RAND Center for 
the Study of Aging.  The original target population for the HRS when the study was initiated in 
1992 is adults born between 1931-1941 (designated ‘HRS Cohort’) and those born before 1924 
(AHEAD cohort).  Every six years the survey adds a new cohort starting in 1998 with those born 
between 1924-1930 (Children of the Depression) and 1942-1947 (War Babies Cohort).  In 2004 
those born between 1948-1953 (Early Baby Boomers Cohort) were added; and the last group 
added was in 2010 with the addition of those born between 1954-1959 (Mid-Baby Boomers 
Cohort).  
                                                          
3 For more information on the HRS and its sample selection, see https://hrs.isr.umich.edu/publications/biblio/9047 
(HRS Staff, 2008).  
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This study uses the HRS due to its specific focus on older Americans.  While much of the 
research on housing uses the American Housing Survey, the HRS includes more information on 
retirement plans, asset composition, and spending in addition to demographical and housing 
characteristics, making it more appealing for this study. 
This study restricts attention to two household types: those consisting of either one 
person aged 55 or older or a married couple where the male is aged 55 or older4.  Urban and rural 
households are determined by the United States Department of Agriculture Rural-Urban 
Continuum Codes5 included in the HRS.  Metropolitan areas are classified as urban and non-
metropolitan areas rural.  All monetary values in the HRS are reported in nominal dollars and 
have been converted into real 2009 dollars using the PCE chain-type price index taken from the 
Federal Reserve Economic Database6. 
I use several key variables in this paper.  The first is whether or not a household has a 
defined benefit plan.  I construct an indicator variable using two metrics from the HRS.  The 
HRS provides a variable for how much each person in the household is receiving from an 
employer pension annually.  This is then constructed into a household variable by combining 
pension income if the household contains two people.  If the household reports receiving pension 
income from the employer, then the indicator variable takes a value of one; if they reported 
receiving no pension income from the employer, this variable takes a value of zero.  This study 
also includes households in their late working years who may not be collecting this income yet.  
In these cases, the HRS has information on whether or not they have a defined benefit plan from 
                                                          
4 This study allows for divorced and widowed households and would fall under a household with one person. 
5 More information on the USDA Rural-Urban Continuum Codes are available at https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-
products/rural-urban-continuum-codes/. 
6 Downloaded from the Federal Reserve Economic Database (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCEPI) on 5/13/2017 
(US Bureau of Economic Analysis)  
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their current job.  If they are working and have a defined benefit plan, then the indicator variable 
takes a value of one; if they are working and do not have a defined benefit plan, then it takes a 
value of zero. 
I also construct an indicator variable for households that have a defined contribution plan 
while not having a defined benefit plan.  The HRS provides a variable for the value of 
households defined contribution plans.  I sum value for all the plans of the household.  Since 
some households may extract the total value of their defined contribution plan, this variable takes 
the value of one if the household at any time reported a positive value for their defined 
contribution plans conditional on not also having a defined benefit plan, and a zero otherwise.   
Non-housing wealth is defined as total household assets less household debt excluding 
the value of the primary residence, mortgages, and home loans.  Income is defined as total 
household income and includes earnings, pension income, social security, and others.  A detailed 
breakdown of the variables used in this analysis and how they were constructed can be found in 
Appendix A. 
B. Weighting 
Because the age distribution of the respondents of the research sample changes from 
wave to wave because to households exit and enter the survey, inverse probability weights are 
constructed for each age group and applied to all analyses in this paper7.  The weight is based on 
the first year in the sample and constructed as follows: 
1
# of  individuals age i in 1998
weight





                                               (1)  
 
                                                          
7 A sensitivity check is conducted in section 7 to explore the results without the weights 
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4. Household Wealth and Homeownership Rates   
A. Household Wealth  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Following the Great Recession, many households saw declines in their non-housing 
wealth.  Table 1 shows that households with a defined benefit plan experienced a 5.5 percent 
decline in non-housing wealth compared to a 31.4 percent decline for households with a defined 
contribution plan.  Households with a defined benefit plan aged 65 and older saw no decline in 
non-housing wealth after the Great Recession whereas households with a defined contribution 
plan did. Households age 65 and over are more than twice as likely to have a defined benefit plan 
as those aged 55-64 and that younger households are more likely to have a defined contribution 
plan.  This is consistent with studies by Buessing and Soto (2006), Copeland (2006), and 
Wiatrowski (2004) that show that employers offering defined benefit plans have been on the 
decline over the last 30 years. 
B. Homeownership Rates 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Table 2 shows homeownership rates for all households before and after the Great 
Recession and for households with both defined benefit and defined contribution plans.  Overall, 
there was a 4-percentage point decline in homeownership rates following the recession.  This is 
largely concentrated in households with defined contribution plans.  These households saw 
declines in homeownership at all age groups and an increase in the rate of renting compared to 
households with a defined benefit plan.  Households with a defined benefit plan saw modest or 
no declines in homeownership rates.  
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 Households with a defined benefit plan tend to be concentrated among those already 
retired at the time of the Great Recession and they did not suffer as much as those between the 
ages of 55-64 and nearing retirement.  However, those at all ages with defined contribution plans 
saw declines in non-housing wealth and a decrease in homeownership rates following the Great 
Recession.  The declines in homeownership rates could be driven by a desire to use their housing 
equity to offset losses in retirement savings or they could no longer afford the mortgage.  Since 
homeownership may no longer be considered as safe an asset as in prior decades, households 
may be storing more of their wealth in other assets.  
C. Transition Rates 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 Table 3 shows the transition rates8 for households that moved for all households and 
households with and without a defined benefit plan.  There was a 2.2-percentage point decrease 
in the percent of older households that moved following the Great Recession.  For homeowners, 
there was a 13.8-percentage point decrease in the percent who moved from owning to owning 
and a corresponding 14.9-percentage point increase in the percent who moved from owning to 
renting.  The change in moving for renters was relatively small compared to that for 
homeowners.  Homeowners in the 55-64 age group saw a 15.7-percentage point decrease in the 
rate of homeowners moving to owning, the largest of all the age groups.  Those aged 65-74 saw a 
9.7-percentage point decline in moving from owning to owning and households aged 75-84 saw 
the smallest decline at 6.7-percentage points.  A smaller number of households moved after the 
                                                          
8 The transition rates in Table 3 are of the same format seen in Feinstein and McFadden (1989) and Venti and Wise 
(1989).  Where is says own/rent in the column that represents the current residence.  This table is to be read across 
showing the number of owners/renters, the percent of owners/renters that moved and the percent that moved to 
owning and the percent that moved to renting 
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Great Recession but out of those who did, they were more likely to move to renting and forgo 
homeownership. 
 Table 3 also shows this breakdown for households with both defined benefit and defined 
contribution plans.  The percent of older households that move after the Great Recession is 
relatively similar for households with defined benefit and defined contribution plans.  The 
percent of households who moved from owning to owning declined 13.1-percentage points for 
households with a defined benefit plan, and is largely concentrated among households aged 55-
64 and corresponds to the only age group that saw a modest decline in homeownership in Table 
2.  The percent of households who moved from owning to owning declined 17.8-percentage 
points for households with defined contribution plans and this decline occurred at all ages, 
corresponding to a drop in homeownership rates at all ages for this group shown in Table 2. 
 In summary, pre-retirement age households are less likely to have defined benefit plans 
than older and retired households and more likely to have defined contribution plans.  
Households with defined contribution plans saw more significant changes in homeownership 
than households with defined benefit plans.  This will be further analyzed using regression 
analysis.  
5. Empirical Strategy 
A.  Difference-In-Difference  
I use a difference-in-difference estimation strategy to measure the effect of the Great 
Recession on homeownership for households with and without defined benefit plans using the 
following regression: 
0 1 2 3prob( 1| )      (2)it it t it t i ithomeownership X DC Post DC Post    = = + + + + + + +  it t'X  
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The dependent variable representing homeownership status for household i  at time t  and is an 
indicator variable that is equal to one if the household reports owning a house and a zero if they 
report renting or other9. 
itDC is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the household has a 
defined contribution plan and is equal to zero if they have a defined benefit plan.  
tPost  is an 
indicator variable that is equal to one in the years after the Great Recession (2010-2014).  The 
coefficient of interest is 
3 , which captures the effect of the Great Recession on homeownership.  
I expect this value to be negative if households without a defined benefit plan were less likely 
than those with one to own a house following the Great Recession. 
The demographic controls included in the vector
it
X  are as follows: inverse hyperbolic 
sine (IHS) of income, lagged IHS of non-housing wealth, an indicator for marital status, an 
indicator for being unemployed, years of education, number of children, age, and age squared.  
i  represents state fixed effects and t represents year fixed effects.  The IHS is used in place of 
logged values to incorporate zero and negative values10.  Table 4 shows the means and 
differences of observable characteristics for households with defined benefit and defined 
contribution plans separated by the treatment period. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 Since the Great Recession had varying impacts on different parts of the country, I split 
the sample into urban and rural households to test for heterogeneous effects across geographic 
areas.  For this purpose, equation (2) was re-estimated for urban and rural households 
independently.    
                                                          
9 The HRS has a third category for living in “other.”  This includes such scenarios as living in a recreational vehicle, 
living with parents rent free, and other types of residential situations besides home ownership and renting 
10 See Burbidge, Magee, and Robb (1988) and Pence (2006) for derivation and use of the IHS transformation. 
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B. Treatment and Control States 
Homeownership rates for households with a defined contribution plan appear to have 
been more affected by the Great Recession and serve as the treatment group.  Defined benefit 
plans are the complement to a defined contribution plan and serve as the control group.  In 
equation (2), 
3  represents the effect of the Great Recession on homeownership status for 
households without a defined benefit plan.  The interpretation of 
3  as the causal effect of the 
Great Recession on homeownership status requires two assumptions.  First, the decision to own a 
home should be exogenous to other policies or observable factors.  For this assumption to be 
true, in the absence of the Great Recession the difference in homeownership trends for 
households with and without a defined benefit plan should be similar before and after 2010.   
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
Table 5 shows a balance test to determine if there were changes in observable characteristics 
before and after the Great Recession.  For each demographic variable, I estimate a variation of 
equation (2) with each control as the dependent variable without the other control variables.  This 
test shows that some of the demographic variables, including non-housing wealth and children, 
have statistically significant changes after the Great Recession.  While such factors might 
influence the decision to own a home, when adding these controls into the estimation, the 
baseline results (shown in the next section) do not fluctuate significantly.  Since there is 
imbalance, I conduct an analysis outlined in Oster (2017) to include bounds on the treatment 
effect to show these results can serve as an upper bound.  While it is not impossible to rule out 
other causes, this eases the concern that the results might be driven by other factors. 
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Second, the interpretation of 
3  as causal requires the outcomes in the treated and control 
groups to follow parallel trends prior to the Great Recession.  I asses the validity of this 
assumption in two ways.  First, the homeownership rates for both groups are visually graphed in 
Figure 1.  Prior to 2010, homeownership rates between the two groups had the same general  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
trend.  Following 2010, households with a defined benefit plan continue the same trend while 
households without show a decline.  A trendline is included to show the trend had it not changed 
after the Great Recession.  Second, I test this assumption by interacting a linear time trend 
(
tTrend ) with the treatment variable, restricting the period to 1998-2008, and estimating the 
following regression equation while including the same controls as in equation (2): 
0 1 2prob( 1| )it it t it i ithomeownership X DC Trend DC   = = + + + + + +  it t'X           (3) 
If the treatment and control groups have similar trends prior to the Great Recession, then 2 in 
equation (3) should be small and statistically insignificant.  Table 6 presents the results of 
equation (3) for all households, urban households, and rural households.  2  is small and 
statistically insignificant for all three models providing evidence of parallel trends prior to the 
Great Recession. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
6. Results 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
A. All Households 
Table 7 shows the results from difference-in-difference regression depicted in equation 
(2).  Column 1 shows the regression outline in equation (2) without controls and, in Column 2, I 
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add demographic controls to ensure they do not impact the results.  Column 1 indicates that 
households with a defined contribution plan were 2.9 percent less likely to own a home after the 
Great Recession than households with a defined contribution plan, an effect that is statistically 
significant at the one percent level.  Column 2 shows that when including demographic controls, 
the effect decreases to 2.1 percent, but remains statistically significant at the five percent level.  
This eases the concern that the results might have been driven by changes in income, non-
housing wealth, or other factors.  A sensitivity analysis is conducted in Section 7 to show that 
these results are robust to observation changes due to adding controls.  These estimates show that 
the Great Recession influenced housing decisions among households with a defined contribution 
plan, but no corresponding effect was seen on households with a defined benefit plan.  It appears 
that having a defined benefit plan as a guaranteed source of income provided security against 
losses they may have suffered that households with a defined contribution plan did not have. 
B. Urban vs Rural Households 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 show the results from difference-in-difference regressions 
when the sample is restricted to just urban households.  Column 3 shows the results without 
demographic controls and Column 4 shows the results with demographic controls.  Column 3 
shows that urban households with a defined contribution plan were 3.3 percent less likely to own 
a house than their urban counterparts with a defined benefit plan.  This effect is statistically 
significant at the one percent level.  This percentage falls to 2.6 percent when adding controls, as 
seen in Column 4, and remains significant at the one percent level.  The small changes seen 
when adding controls again ease the concern about other factors driving the results. 
 Columns 5 and 6 show the results from the difference-in-difference regressions when the 
sample is restricted to just rural households.  Column 5 does not include demographic controls 
22 
 
and Column 6 does.  None of the results are statistically significant, suggesting that the Great 
Recession did not impact homeownership for rural households the way it did urban households.  
This is a trend seen in other studies showing that urban households were affected more severely 
by the Great Recession than their rural counterparts (Thiede and Monnat 2016; Mattingly, Smith, 
and Bean 2011).  Bailey, Jenson, and Ransom (2014) note that many rural areas were already 
suffering with a troubled labor market due to lower levels of education and aging populations, 
perhaps because the decline in the manufacturing sector had already produced economic 
hardships in these areas (Slack 2014).  The fact that rural households did not experience the same 
economic decline as urban households likely explains why the lack of significant change in 
homeownership differential between households with and without defined benefit plans.     
7. Sensitivity and Robustness Checks 
 [INSERT TABLE 8a HERE] 
 To ensure that the changing sample from adding controls is not what is influencing the 
coefficient change, I re-estimate the results from Table 6 Column 1 but restrict it to the sample 
found in Column 2.  The results of this are shown in Panel A of Table 8a.  The treatment effect 
decrease by 0.3 percentage points showing that households with a defined contribution plan are 
3.2 percent less likely to own a house after the Great Recession compared to households with a 
defined benefit plan.  This small change provides evidence the changing sample is not 
influencing the results. 
 The HRS sample used in this study also incorporates the recession that started in March 
2001 and ended in November 2001.  There should be no impact on homeownership from this 
recession since the impact of the housing market was unique to the Great Recession.  To test this, 
I re-estimate equation (2) with using the 2001 recession as the treatment period instead of 2008.  
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The results of this regression are shown in Panel B of Table 8a and show that there was no 
impact of homeownership for households without a defined benefit plan compared to those that 
did have one.  This provides further evidence that it was indeed the Great Recession that is 
causing these results not just economic downturns in general. 
 Panel C of Table 9a shows the results of the difference-in-difference models without 
using age weights mentioned in Section 3.  The results without the weights are slightly more 
negative but show the same trend as the results using the age weights.  The age weights place 
slightly more emphasis on older age groups to account for survival bias.  The results being more 
negative without weights makes sense because the Great Recession had a greater impact on 
homeownership for those 55-64 compared to those 65 and older, and removing the age weights 
gives the younger age group a larger share of the sample. 
 Due to the imbalance of observables, I cannot rule out the impact of unobservables on the 
results, however it is possible to provide bounds on the treatment effect to show how the 
unobservable might impact the results. Oster (2017) provides an extension to Altonji, Elder, and 
Taber (2005), which outlines the procedure11.  Oster (2017) shows that assuming the role of 
observables is proportional to the role of observables in determine treatment effect, it is possible 
to determine a bound on the treatment effect.  If the bound does not include zero, this provides 
information on the direction unobservable might influence the results.  The bounds from this 
procedure, using the Stata code accompanying Oster (2017), are shown in Panel D of Table 8a.  
The bound on the treatment effect does not include zero for any of the regressions, suggesting 
that the estimates shown in Table 6 may be an upper bound.    
                                                          
11 Several recent studies have incorporated this procedure including Baranov et al. (2015), Gunes and Tsaneva 
(2016), and Ozier (2018),  
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[INSERT TABLE 8b HERE] 
 In Table 8b I split the sample in two different ways to measure the impact of the Great 
Recession on homeownership.  In Panel A I restrict the sample so that at least one person in the 
household is working.  This shows that working households with a defined contribution plan 
were 2.1 percent less likely to own a house after the Great Recession compared to households 
with a defined benefit plan.  Urban households with defined contribution plans were  2.3 percent 
less likely to own a home following the Great Recession though only significant at the ten 
percent level, and much like the full sample, there is no significant effect for rural households.  
In Panel B I restrict the sample to households that are fully retired.  The effect of having a 
defined contribution plan is of similar magnitude as the full sample but is not statistically 
significant. This is not unexpected as a large percentage of households that were already retired 
at the time of the Great Recession had defined benefit plans (see Table 1) and those that did not, 
had most likely started to adjust their portfolio away from stocks and risky assets once they hit 
retirement (Fagereng, Gottlieb, and Guiso 2017).  As such, they most likely did not see as severe 
losses as pre-retirement households who still possessed risky assets.  Hurd and Rohwedder 
(2010) note that retirees were likely to suffer less than those who were in their late working 
years.  It is important to note that the number of Americans working past age 65 has been 
increasing since the 1990s (Hurd and Rohwedder 2010; Kaul and Goodman 2017; Toosi 2015).  
Therefore, this effect is not necessarily isolated to just households under age 65, but to 
households that have not fully decided to retire.  In summary, having a defined contribution plan 
lead to a significant decrease in homeownership after the Great Recession compared to 
households with a defined benefit plan, however this effect appears to be largely concentrated 
among urban households where at least one person is working.   
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These sensitivity and robustness checks show that the results are robust and most likely 
not driven by unobservable factors and that they were indeed caused by the Great Recession. 
8. Conclusions and Discussion  
 The Great Recession was one of the most severe economic downturns in contemporary 
American history.  Households experienced declines in income, savings, and property values.  
For Americans that were retired or near retirement, these losses could be difficult if not 
impossible to recover.  Having a defined benefit plan may have possibly mitigated some of the 
losses that may have been suffered in other assets.  Households with defined contribution plans 
saw losses in their retirement portfolio and wealth without the security that a defined benefit plan 
provides.  As a result, households with defined contribution plans saw larger declines in 
homeownership compared to households with a defined benefit plan.  Additionally, households 
with defined contribution plans saw a larger decline in the amount of homeowners who moved 
from owning to owning and a larger increase in the percent of homeowners who moved from 
owning to renting.  It is possible that in the future, homeownership may no longer be regarded as 
the safe investment it once was; storing wealth in excess housing equity carries new risk.  In 
addition, an increasing number of households no longer have defined benefit plans and rely more 
heavily on defined contribution plans.  With much savings tied up in potentially more risky 
assets, households with a defined contribution plan appear less likely to store wealth in housing 
equity in retirement, needing it to maintain spending levels.  This is a new phenomenon; 
historically, many households have died with large sums of housing equity they could have used. 
 This paper provides some of the first evidence of the impact of the Great Recession upon 
homeownership in the context of housing equity use by older Americans.  I find that households 
with a defined contribution plan were 2.1-2.9 percent less likely to own a house than those with a 
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defined benefit plan after the Great Recession.  By contrast, homeownership rates after the 
recession were relatively unchanged for the latter group.  Comparing this effect between urban 
and rural areas, I find that this effect appears largely concentrated in urban areas where 
households with a defined contribution plan were 2.6-3.3 percent less likely than those with a 
defined benefit plan to own a home after the Great Recession.  In households where at least one 
person is working, households with a defined contribution plan were 2.1 percent less likely to 
own a home after the recession compared to households with a defined benefit plan.  No such 
differential effect was found in rural areas or households that are fully retired, which is consistent 
with other studies that show the impact of the Great Recession was more heavily concentrated in 
urban areas and that older retirees are more likely to have defined benefit plans and less likely to 
have risky assets which both mitigate the impact of the Great Recession. 
 In the post-Great Recession era, an increasing number of retirees are going to be living 
off their accumulated savings in risky assets with defined benefit plans disappearing in favor of 
defined contribution plans.  Since house prices declined during the Great Recession, there is no 
guarantee that housing prices will not decline again.  Storing wealth in housing equity is now 
potentially associated with some risk.  It is likely that future retirees without defined benefit 
plans, being unable to count on their home value always increasing, may reduce housing equity 
and even forgo homeownership altogether, storing that wealth in other assets.  Historically, 
having a defined benefit plan gave households enough guaranteed income that they possibly 
chose not to use the equity in their house even though they were able to do so.  Future 
households may not have this luxury.  As America’s population ages and people live longer in 
retirement, understanding how Americans finance their retirement – and how this will change in 
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the future – is important as federal, state, and local policymakers look to shape policy for the 21st 
century.    
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Note: Median income and non-housing wealth are reported in real 2009 dollars  
10. Tables and Figures 
 
 
                
    All Households With DB Plan With DC Plan 
Age   1998-2008 2010-2014 1998-2008 2010-2014 1998-2008 2010-2014 
ALL 
Median Income 30,657 32,066 38,452 41,888 62,666 63,465 
Median Non-Housing Wealth 49,415 28,270 92,575 87,454 91,940 63,041 
% with DB Plan 41.81 32.35     
% with DC Plan 12.26 21.24     
55-64 
Median Income 51,292 46,725 55,960 62,236 76,387 80,623 
Median Non-Housing Wealth 53,168 16,019 107,587 70,203 87,622 54,042 
% with DB Plan 20.03 10.68     
% with DC Plan 34.68 37.29     
65-74 
Median Income 33,880 36,985 42,761 49,289 51,198 45,442 
Median Non-Housing Wealth 57,740 46,236 99,935 104,443 96,737 88,578 
% with DB Plan 44.86 40.28     
% with DC Plan 11.82 22.67     
75-84 
Median Income 25,626 26,116 34,473 37,655 39,773 28,254 
Median Non-Housing Wealth 49,379 40,333 87,211 88,955 84,135 52,138 
% with DB Plan 53.09 46.98         





Table 1.  Household Wealth Before and After the Great Recession 
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    All Households With DB Plan With DC Plan 
Age   1998-2008 2010-2014 1998-2008 2010-2014 1998-2008 2010-2014 
ALL 
Own 76.70 72.86 83.86 82.85 88.40 84.55 
Rent  19.98 26.09 13.57 16.21 10.58 16.21 
 55-64 
Own 81.06 69.28 91.40 87.10 89.11 84.51 
Rent  16.82 29.85 7.31 12.17 9.11 15.00 
65-74 
Own 80.05 79.66 88.4 89.06 87.60 85.63 
Rent  17.88 19.55 10.30 10.28 11.39 14.03 
75-84 
Own 75.43 76.30 81.04 83.08 90.96 81.96 









Table 2.  Homeownership rates Before and After the Great Recession 
33 
 
Note: Columns may not sum to 100% because the HRS includes a third option for homeownership called “other.”  This table shows on the columns whether or not 
the household is an owner or a renter and if they move, the percent that move to owning or renting for the rows.  For example: For all households between 1998-
2008, 8.13% of households that are current owners decided to move and 71.04% of them decided to move to owning and 25.21% decided to move to renting 
 
                            
      1998-2008 
    All Households With DB Plan With DC Plan 
AGE   N % Move Own Rent N % Move Own Rent N % Move Own Rent 
ALL 
Own 41,246 8.13 71.04 25.21 17,539 8.04 70.09 26.28 8,024 8.87 82.90 14.79 
Rent 9,628 20.48 13.55 80.69 2,524 21.86 14.64 79.28 938 30.10 29.83 67.63 
55-64 
Own 14,212 9.26 84.59 13.79 3,034 9.66 91.51 7.78 5,899 9.79 86.55 11.60 
Rent 2,789 25.95 22.97 71.25 227 30.39 30.47 65.80 630 31.88 36.85 59.12 
65-74 
Own 15,403 7.56 76.18 20.87 7,829 7.40 77.07 20.47 1,938 7.93 77.94 18.92 
Rent 3,239 20.54 13.16 82.05 897 22.70 17.25 76.98 246 28.81 22.91 76.13 
75-84 
Own 9,313 7.68 59.51 34.54 5,417 8.04 59.03 34.44 211 6.39 73.41 26.59 
Rent 2,261 17.47 10.1 84.26 938 19.09 13.70 6.53 23 32.90 11.32 88.68 
      2010-2014 
ALL 
Own 13,462 5.89 57.27 40.08 4,388 5.68 57.02 40.77 3,925 5.49 65.15 33.42 
Rent 4,317 19.79 12.59 84.11 757 19.11 17.98 77.62 636 26.95 16.83 82.02 
55-64 
Own 5,912 6.37 68.86 32.9 796 5.60 58.99 41.01 2,717 5.79 66.17 32.17 
Rent 2,298 24.66 12.61 84.9 94 31.43 16.30 83.70 436 27.43 16.24 81.86 
65-74 
Own 3,776 4.85 66.44 29.84 1,693 4.64 76.10 20.87 932 5.02 61.10 37.68 
Rent 845 19.74 13.25 83.9 187 19.98 21.15 78.85 142 27.19 20.24 79.76 
75-84 
Own 2,934 5.38 52.86 43.49 2,257 4.99 54.95 44.09 331 5.87 69.79 30.21 
Rent 837 13.66 12.05 85.91 423 17.43 22.20 77.80 60 25.33 6.89 93.11 
 
 




Note: The first two columns for each group provides the means and standard deviations for the treatment and control groups in the pre-period (1998-2008) and 
the post period (2010-2014).  The last column for each group provides the results from a t-test to see if there are significant differences between the treatment 
and control in the pre-period.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10  
                       
  Households with DB Pension   Households with DC Pension     
  Pre Post   Diff   Pre Post   Diff   Diff in Diff 
sinh-1(Income) 11.29 11.38   -0.08***   11.68 11.59   0.09***   0.17 
  (0.75) (0.83)       (1.14) (1.47)         
sinh-1(Non-Housing Wealth) 10.87 10.50   0.37***   11.02 9.89   1.13***   0.76 
  (4.84) (5.88)       (5.10) (6.52)         
Years of Education 12.55 13.27   -0.72***   13.24 13.65   -0.42***   0.30 
  (2.89) (2.79)       (2.89) (2.72)         
Number of Children 3.02 2.98   0.04   3.16 2.82   0.33***   0.29 
  (2.02) (2.00)       (1.96) (1.80)         
Married 0.61 0.57   0.03***   0.74 0.72   0.02***   -0.01 
  (0.48) (0.52)       (0.44) (0.45)         
Unemployed 0.01 0.02  -0.01***  0.03 0.05  -0.03***  -0.02 
 (0.09) (0.13)    (0.16) (0.23)     
Age 73.92 75.67   -1.75***   63.95 64.06   -0.11   1.64 
  (8.38) (9.89)       (5.71) (7.51)         
                        











Note: Standard errors are clustered at the household level.  Controls include an indicator for 
marital status, and indicator for being unemployed, years of education, age, age squared, IHS 
of income, lagged IHS of non-housing wealth, and state fixed effects.  These regressions 
were only run in the pre-period which is from 1998-2008.  




Note: Standard errors are clustered at the household level.  Each cell represents a separate 
regression.  Columns 1 includes the full sample.  Column 2 restricts the sample to urban 
households.  Column 3 restricts the sample to rural households.  All specifications include 




        
Dependent Variable All Households Urban Rural 
        
sinh-1 (Income) -0.176*** -0.186*** -0.175*** 
  (0.027) (0.031) (0.050) 
sinh-1 (Non-Housing Wealth) -0.778*** -0.794*** -0.524* 
  (0.140) (0.159) (0.277) 
Years of Education -0.260*** -0.330*** -0.071 
  (0.070) (0.080) (0.050) 
Number of Children 0.284*** -0.305*** -0.126 
  (0.050) (0.056) (0.112) 
Married 0.011 0.018 -0.013 
  (0.004) (0.014) (0.026) 
Unemployed -0.019*** 0.021*** 0.009 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
Age -1.324*** -1.570*** 0.114 






          
  All Households Urban Rural 
  (1)  (2) (3) 
DC Plan X Time Trend 0.003  0.004 -0.005 
  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.006) 
        
Observations 31,111  25,597 5,514 





Table 6.  Test for Significant Pre-Trends 
Table 5.  Balance Test 
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Note: Standard errors are clustered at the household level.  Columns 1 and 2 include the full sample.  Columns 2 and 4 restrict the sample to urban 
households.  Columns 5 and 6 restrict the sample to rural households.  Controls include an indicator for marital status, and indicator for being 
unemployed, years of education, age, age squared, IHS of income, and lagged IHS of non-housing wealth.  All specifications include state fixed 






                        
  All Households   Urban   Rural 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
DC Plan x Post-2008 -0.029***   -0.021**   -0.033***   -0.026***   -0.004   0.009 
  (0.010)   (0.009)   (0.011)   (0.010)   (0.021)   (0.020) 
                        
Observations 50,372   46,218   41,714   38,177   8,658   8,041 
R2 0.021   0.164   0.024   0.152   0.033   0.149 









Table 7.  Estimation Results 
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Note: Standard errors are clustered at the household level.  Panels A-C represent separate regressions.  Panel A shows the same 
regression in Table 7 Column 1 but restricted to the sample of Table 7 Column 2.  Panel D shows the bounds on the treatment 
effect suggested by Oster (2017) using the Stata code provided with the article. Columns 1 includes the full sample.  Column 2 
restricts the sample to urban households.  Column 3 restricts the sample to rural households.  Controls include an indicator for 
marital status, and indicator for being unemployed, years of education, age, age squared, IHS of income, and lagged IHS of non-
housing wealth.  All specifications include state fixed effects and year fixed effects.   
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
 
 
        
  All Households Urban Rural 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Equal Observations with Controls       
DC Plan x Post-2008 -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.002 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.022) 
     
Observations 46,218 38,177 8,041 
R2 0.021 0.024 0.033 
Covariates NO NO NO 
Panel B: 2001 Recession as Treatment Period       
DC Plan x Post-2002 0.005 0.008 -0.004 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) 
     
Observations 46,218 38,177 8,041 
R2 0.164 0.170 0.159 
Covariates YES YES YES 
Panel C: No Age Weights       
DC Plan x Post-2008 -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.002 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.018) 
     
Observations 46,563 38,478 8,085 
R2 0.157 0.161 0.158 
Covariates YES YES YES 
Panel D: Coefficient Bounds       
Without Controls -0.029*** -0.033*** -0.004 
With Controls -0.021** -0.026*** 0.009 
    









Table 8a.  Sensitivity Checks 
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Note: Standard errors are clustered at the household level.  Each panel represents a separate regression.  
Columns 1 includes the full sample.  Column 2 restricts the sample to urban households.  Column 3 restricts the 
sample to rural households.  Controls include an indicator for marital status, years of education, age, age 
squared, IHS of income, and lagged IHS of non-housing wealth.  All specifications include state fixed effects 
and year fixed effects.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
 
 
            
  
All 
Households   Urban   Rural 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
Panel A: One Person in Household Working           
DC Plan x Post-2008 -0.021**  -0.023*  -0.002 
  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.023) 
       
Observations 20,336  16,703  3,633 
R2 0.123  0.130  0.117 
Covariates YES   YES   YES 
Panel B: Household Completely Retired           
DC Plan x Post-2008 -0.025  -0.029  -0.002 
  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.034) 
       
Observations 22,110  18,321  3,789 
R2 0.190  0.195  0.198 




Table 8b.  Sensitivity Checks 
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Defined Benefit Plan Defined Contribution Plan
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Appendix A: Description of Variables 
Variables from the HRS are taken from two sources.  The first is the Enhanced FAT files 
compiled by the RAND Center for the Study of Aging, which compiles the raw data from the 
survey into one file for each wave making it easier to merge with other waves.  The second is 
from the RAND HRS data file.  Developed at RAND with funding from the National Institute on 
Aging and the Social Security Administration, it is a cleaned file containing HRS data from all 
waves of the survey (RAND HRS Data 2016).  RAND takes the raw responses from the HRS –in 
some cases, questions vary across waves – and combine them into a variable that is consistent 
across waves. 
Variable Description 
Household Residence Household residence type comes from the enhanced FAT files where it 
is self-reported whether a person owns, rents, lives in other, or 
unknown.  The “other” category means anything outside of owning or 
renting, and the respondent is asked to specify.  These specifications 
include but are not limited to: an assisted living facility, retirement 
facility, nursing home, motel, living rent-free with friends or family, and 
recreational vehicle.  This variable is split into a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the respondent reports owning and a 0 if the 
respondent reports renting or other. If it is unknown, the variable is 
coded as missing. 
Household Income Household income comes from the RAND HRS file and is a sum of all 
the self-reported income to the household, which includes: individual 
earnings, capital income, pension income, annuity income, social 
security, other government transfers, and other household income. 
Non-Housing Wealth Non-Housing Wealth comes from the RAND HRS file and is the sum of 
the self-reported values of real estate excluding the primary residence, 
vehicles, businesses, IRA accounts, stock value, checking accounts, 
checkable deposits, bonds, and other savings minus household debt.  
Defined Benefit Plan The Defined Benefit Plan indicator variable is created using two 
variables from the RAND HRS File.  The first is pension income and 
the second is whether or not a pension is offered at the current job.  
Pension income is reported separately for the respondent and the spouse, 
these are combined to determining a total household value of pension 
income.  If either the respondent or the spouse report having a defined 
benefit plan at their current job or the household reports receiving. 
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income from a defined benefit plan, the household is recorded as having 
a defined benefit plan.  
Defined Contribution Plan The Defined Contribution Plan indicator variable is creating using the 
self-reported balance of their defined contribution accounts.  There are 
four variables that households can report.  For each individual I sum 
these four variables.  I then sum across the household to get the total 
value of defined contribution plans for the household.  If a household 
ever reported having a positive value in their defined contribution plan, 
this variable takes a value of one.  This variable takes a value of zero if 
they do not or if they also report having a defined benefit plan. 
Years of Education Years of Education comes from the RAND HRS file. 
Number of Children Number of Children comes from the RAND HRS file. 
Age Age comes from the RAND HRS file.  The household variable for age 
is determined by the age of the male in married households and the age 
of the individual in single households. 
Marital Status Marital Status comes from the RAND HRS file.  This is a dummy 
variable taking a value of 1 if they report they are married and a value of 





Do Potential Future Health Shocks Keep Older Americans from Using Their 
Housing Equity? 
Abstract: Many retirees retain housing equity and do not utilize it to help finance spending on 
consumption.  In this paper, I examine how older Americans (age 55+) may engage in 
precautionary savings where households would sell their house in the event they face an increase 
in out-of-pocket medical expenses due to a health shock.  Using a counterfactual experiment, I 
find that older households are 13-percentage points less likely to own a home in their late 
retirement years when they know they will not have any out-of-pocket medical expenses. This 
indicates that many older households prefer not to own a home but choose to do so knowing they 
may get sick and thus are engaging in precautionary savings using their house.  I conduct a policy 
experiment to examine how an insurance policy that would cover all out-of-pocket medical 
expenses would impact home ownership.  I find that when an insurance policy of this nature is 
offered that costs four percent of income, the baseline economy has the same homeownership and 
moving rates as the counterfactual experiment where households do not have to pay for out-of-
pocket medical expenses.  This suggests that if seniors had more adequate health care coverage, 














With nearly 80 percent owning a home according to the US Census Bureau (2018), 
housing equity accounts for nearly half the net worth of retired Americans (Moulton et al. 2016).  
Households have housing equity that could be used to increase consumption in retirement, as is 
the case with other investments such as stocks and bonds.  While households could extract equity 
from their home by taking out a reverse mortgage or moving, this typically is not the case.  
Previous research has shown that 57 to 75 percent of households 65 and older will live alone in 
their house after retirement with approximately 16 percent staying in that home until death 
(Borsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou, and Kotlikoff 1992).  Households tend not to adjust their housing 
equity except in the event of a shock to the structure of the household such as divorce or the 
death of a spouse (Ai et al. 1990; Feinstein and McFadden 1989; Fisher et al. 2007; Poterba, 
Venti, and Wise 2011; Venti and Wise 2001, 2004, 1989, 1990).  This contradicts the predictions 
of the Life-Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) which suggests that households save during their working 
years and draw down those savings in retirement (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954). 
As homeowners age, it becomes more difficult to borrow money.  Therefore, they may 
choose to engage in precautionary savings using their home and sell it to cover unexpected 
medical bills (Poterba, Venti, and Wise 2011; Nakajima and Telyukova 2013; Venti and Wise 
2001; Stucki 2005; Fisher et al. 2007).  In this paper, I explore how this option might preclude 
such homeowners from using the equity in their home to increase consumption in retirement.  I 
construct a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model to assess the impact of an increase in 
out-of-pocket medical expenses caused by potential health shocks in old age on the housing 




I model an economy that consists of overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents 
who must make decisions in each period: whether to rent or buy, what size house or apartment to 
inhabit, and how much to spend on consumption in each period.  Agents can borrow (subject to a 
loan-to-value constraint) or save in each period.  In the model, homeowners must pay property 
taxes and face transaction costs if they sell their homes.  I show in Section 7 that this model 
produces similar homeownership rates to data found in the Health and Retirement Study. 
I start by modeling an economy where agents in late retirement (age 72-77) have a 
chance of receiving a health shock where they incur out-of-pocket medical expenses that they are 
forced to pay for through either their income or accumulated assets, including the home.  Next, I 
model an economy where agents know with certainty that they will not incur an increase in 
medical bills and compare the housing choices of the two groups.  When agents are certain they 
are not at risk of an increase in medical bills, homeownership rates decrease by as much as 13-
percentage points after reaching age 72.  There is also an increase in the rates of moving and in 
changing from owning to renting.  This indicates that households are using their home as a form 
of precautionary savings.  This notion is reinforced in a sensitivity analysis showing that for 
higher rates of out-of-pocket medical expenses, rates of homeownership increase beyond what is 
seen in the benchmark model. 
Medicare only covers 65 percent of retiree’s medical bills (De Nardi et al. 2015).  
Because of this, many retirees have some sort of supplemental health insurance and long-term 
care insurance to help cover the additional costs that include coinsurance payments and 
premiums.  However, even with supplemental insurance, many retirees still face high out-of-
pocket medical expenses, particularly as the need for long-term care arises after age 70.  A more 
thorough look at health insurance coverage for seniors and some of the costs they will encounter 
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can be found in Section 2.  With the possibility of incurring large out-of-pocket medical bills, 
despite coverage from Medicare and supplemental insurance, it appears that households retain 
excess housing equity as a form of precautionary savings.  This raises questions to the adequacy 
of the current health insurance structure for retirees.  Considering this, I test the impact of an 
insurance policy that would cover all out-of-pocket medical expenses, particularly focusing on 
medical expenses incurred after age 71.  This type of insurance frees up the equity in the house 
to help finance consumption in retirement and allows households to act more in accordance with 
the LCH.  I find that if an insurance policy of this nature is offered, 12.8 percent of households 
would be willing to purchase this insurance policy if the cost was four percent of household 
income.  With the inclusion of this policy along with a possible health shock, rates of 
homeownership and moving look like the economy where agents know with certainty that they 
will not incur an increase in medical bills.  This suggests that if households do not have to worry 
about saving for potential out-of-pocket medical costs, they would be more willing to use the 
equity in their house to help finance consumption in retirement. 
This paper contributes to two strands of literature.  First, it supplements existing literature 
that addresses the question of why so many Americans do not use their housing equity toward 
consumption in retirement.  Empirical studies, such as Borsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou, and 
Kotlikoff (1992); Feinstein and McFadden (1989); Fisher et al. (2007); Hurd (1992); Poterba, 
Venti, and Wise (2011); Venti and Wise (1989, 1990, 2001, 2004) and others, show that retirees 
are not using their housing equity in accordance with the LCH and explore possible causes such 
as precautionary savings, bequests, and high transaction costs.  This paper uses an overlapping 
generations model of housing and consumption to explore how households may engage in 
precautionary savings using their house.  This model complements the work of 
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Anagnostopoulos, Atesagaoglui, and Carceles-Poveda (2013); Davis and Heathcote (2005); 
Imrohoroglu, Matoba, and Tuzel (2018); Fisher and Gervais (2011); Li and Yao (2007); Cocco 
(2004) and others.  While most of these investigations focus on the entire life cycle, this paper 
restricts its focus to Americans age 55 and older.  
2. Health Insurance for Retirees 
Medicare provides health insurance to adults age 65 and older in the United States and 
has several components1.  Medicare Part A covers in-patient hospital visits, hospice care, and 
some health care.  Most households do not pay a premium for Part A because they paid enough 
Medicare taxes while working, however, they are required to make coinsurance payments2.  
Medicare Part B covers doctors’ visits, out-patient care, physical therapy, and some other health 
care costs not covered by Part A.  There is a monthly premium for Part B that is based on 
adjusted-gross income and some services require a coinsurance payment once a deductible is 
met3.  Medicare Part D covers prescription drugs and comes with a monthly premium paid in 
addition to the premium for Part B4.  Medicare beneficiaries also have the option to enroll in a 
Medicare Advantage Plan, also called Medicare Part C.  These are private health insurance plans, 
typically HMOs, that provide the same benefits covered by Part A and Part B5.  30 percent of 
Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans in 2014 (Cubanski et al. 
2015).   
                                                 
1 Information on what Medicare covers and its various parts are available at: 
https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers.   
2 More information on costs for Medicare Part A is available at: https://www.medicare.gov/your-medicare-
costs/part-a-costs  
3 More information on costs for Medicare Part B is available at: https://www.medicare.gov/your-medicare-
costs/part-b-costs  
4 More information on costs for Medicare Part D is available at: https://www.medicare.gov/drug-coverage-
part-d/costs-for-medicare-drug-coverage/monthly-premium-for-drug-plans  




Medicare covers 65 percent of the medical expenses of retirees (De Nardi et al. 2015).  
The remaining 35 percent come from payments on premiums, deductibles, and other services not 
covered by Medicare (e.g., long-term services and dental care).  This causes many older 
households to incur high out-of-pocket costs on health care (Cubanski et al. 2018).  Because of 
these costs, 86 percent of Medicare beneficiaries had some sort of supplemental health insurance 
in 2010 (Cubanski et al. 2015).  Supplemental insurance policies are available to individuals 
enrolled in Medicare Part A and B and are sold by private health care companies.  These plans 
are highly regulated and require a monthly premium and cover some of the costs Medicare does 
not cover.  However, even with supplemental insurance many households still pay between 
$4,000-$8,000 per year in out-of-pocket health care expenses (De Nardi et al. 2015; Cubanski et 
al. 2015) 
Between the ages of 70 and 90, out-of-pocket medical expenses more than double.  This 
is primarily driven by spending on long-term care and nursing home stay, which can cost around 
$80,000 a year (De Nardi et al. 2015; Fisher et al. 2007).  Given the uncertainty of when long-
term care will be necessary, this is a possibility why households hold on to excess housing equity 
as a form of precautionary savings. In this paper, I explore how using the house as precautionary 
savings may change if retirees had these additional costs covered by insurance.    
3. Data 
Due to its specific focus on Americans in their late working and retirement years, I use the 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS), to aid in the parameterization of the model and asses how 
well the output fits the data.  I use individual and household level data from ten waves of the 
HRS from 1996-2014.  The HRS is a longitudinal survey that includes about 20,000 households 
over age 50 selected through a multi-stage probability sample design that is a sample of the 
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United States population over age 50.  This survey oversamples Black and Hispanic populations 
to support research on racial and ethnic disparities and defines an observational unit as an 
eligible household financial unit where at least one person is an eligible member the defined 
cohorts6. The HRS is administered by the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research in 
partnership with the RAND Center for the Study of Aging.  When the study was initiated in 
1992, the original target population for the HRS was adults born between 1931-1941 (HRS 
Cohort) and those born before 1924 (AHEAD cohort).  Every six years the survey adds a new 
cohort starting in 1998 with those born between 1924-1930 (Children of the Depression) and 
1942-1947 (War Babies Cohort).  In 2004 those born between 1948-1953 (Early Baby Boomers 
Cohort) were added, and then lastly in 2010, those born between 1954-1959 (Mid-Baby Boomers 
Cohort) were added.  
I restrict the data to two household types: one-person households where the person is 
aged 55 or older and two-person households of married couples where the male is aged 55 or 
older7. 
4. A Model of Housing Dynamics with Potential Health Shocks at Old Age 
A. Demographics and Income  
In a framework that is similar in nature to Imrohoroglu, Matoba, and Tuzel (2018) and 
Gervais (2002), the economy is populated with overlapping generations of agents at three stages 
of life, {1,2,3}ts  .  Agents work during the first stage (age 55-64) and are retired in the last two 
stages (age 65-71 and 72-77 respectfully).  In each period t , agents advance from one stage to 
                                                 
6 For more information on the HRS and its sample selection, see 
https://hrs.isr.umich.edu/publications/biblio/9047 (HRS Staff 2008) 
7 This includes divorced and widowed individuals  
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the next with probability 
s  and spend another period in the current stage with probability 1 s− .  
When an agent dies, they are replaced by a new agent in the first stage of life. 
During the first stage of life, labor income, sty , is given by ( ) ( )log logs st ty w e= + .  The 
term sw  represents the wage profile of the individual and te  represents an AR(1) stochastic 
shock to income every period, given by 
1t t te e −= + .  t  is normally distributed with mean 
zero and variance 2  and 1 , it captures the persistence of the stochastic component to labor 
income.  During the final two stages of life, individuals are retired and face a certain retirement 
income that declines as they age.  In the third stage of life, agents are subject to a possible health 
shock, t , that is associated with unexpected medical bills that can potentially occur each period.  
Agents are aware that there is a possible health shock in the future but do not know whether they 
will receive one.  Agents die with probability 
3  in the third stage and are replaced by an agent 
in the first stage.  In stage 3, agents can potentially face immediate death (e.g., total acute 
myocardial infarction), a long-term illness (e.g., cancer), or a one-time health shock (e.g., broken 
bone).  
B. Housing 
Agents will be endowed with units of housing at time 0t =  which they will live in the 
first period.  After the first period, agents will have access to a mortgage market when 
purchasing a home.  If they purchase a home, they are required to make a down payment.  If an 
agent sells their home, they face transaction costs (e.g., realtor fees, moving costs, etc.).  
Homeowners have to pay property taxes, 
p p
t t t tT p h= , where 
p
t  is the property tax rate and tp
is the price of a unit of housing.  Renters do not have to pay property taxes.   Households make 
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decisions on consumption, housing arrangements, and their mortgage each period after observing 
their income and whether they receive a health shock8.   
In the background of the model, there are financial institutions that provide loans to 
homeowners, hold residential rental capital, and pool individual’s deposits.  These financial 
institutions own all the rental housing units.  In this model, housing stock is fixed at H .  
Housing stock is equal to housing owned by individuals plus housing owned by the financial 
institutions.  Homeowners can either be savers – earning an interest rate of dr ; or borrowers in 
the mortgage market facing a mortgage rate of mr .  The interest payments on mortgages is tax 
deductible. 
C. Individuals Problem  
Homeowners must pay a transaction cost if they choose to sell their home.  Let 
th be 
exogenous the quantity of housing an agent has at time t .  Let 
renth  be the set of house sizes 
available to renters and ownh  be the sizes of homes available to owners.  Let { }rentth h  indicate 
an agent who is a renter and { }ownth h indicate an agent who is a homeowner.  Transaction 
costs, 
1( , )t tF h h + , are defined by 
1  
1
 if { } and 
( , )
0       otherwise                       
own
t t t t t
t t







                                       (2) 
where   represents the proportion of the house value paid in transaction costs (e.g., real estate 
agent fees, moving costs, etc.).  Homeowners who move to a different size home must pay 
                                                 
8 In this paper, health shock refers to an increase in unexpected medical bills in the third stage of life.  
While individuals can suffer health shocks at any age, this study is specifically interested in how an 
increase unexpected medical bills after age 72 impacts homeownership decisions because this is where 
households are likely to see the largest increases in out-of-pocket medical spending.  See De Nardi et al. 
(2015) for more information.   
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transaction costs.  I assume that a household who remains in the same size house did not move.  
All renters who move do not pay the transaction cost.     
Households can borrow against the value of their home (mortgage 
1ta + ) and are subject to 
a loan-to-value constraint  , given by  
 1 1 1  if { }
own
t t t ta p h h h+ + +                                                               (3)  
Homeowners are not allowed to default on their mortgages.  Renters do not have access 
to the mortgage market and are only allowed to save.  A negative mortgage represents savings 
that receives interest rate dr  
1
1
  if 0













                                                                     (4) 
Following Imrohoroglu, Matoba, and Tuzel (2018), this model implements progressive 
income taxes and uses the tax function from Gouveia and Strauss (1994), which has the 










= − + 
  
                                                        (5) 
where y is taxable income, and ( )
0 1 2
, ,     are policy parameters on income taxes that 
determine progressivity and level of taxes collected .  Interest paid on mortgages, tra , and 
property taxes, 
p
tT , are tax deductible and interest on savings is taxable.  Taxable income during 
the first stage of life is  
( )max 0, pt t ty y ra T = − −                                                           (6) 
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For simplicity it is assumed that retirees do not pay income on their retirement income, but 
property taxes and mortgage interest are still tax deductible.  Taxable income for the last two 
stages of life is  
( )max 0, pt ty ra T = − −                                                              (7) 
 In the event an agent dies, the financial institution sells the house and distributes the net 
assets of all the deceased agents in the form of an accidental bequest in the next period.  This 
bequest is denoted by 
tq .  Homes have a depreciation rate of   .  This can be viewed as the 
maintenance and upkeep costs of living in a home that homeowners must pay.  
In each period agents seek to maximize utility and face budget constraints which are a 
function of current and future homeownership status.  Agents derive utility from consumption 
and housing.  Agents maximize the utility from consumption and housing in each stage given by: 
1
1












                                                      (8) 
where   is the relative weight of housing and consumption and s  is relative risk aversion. 
a. The First Stage 
In the first stage, agents are considered working and receive income, 1ty  , as well as a 
bequest from the previous generation who just died, tq .  Agents are endowed with housing 0h  
and can either be a homeowner or a renter depending on the value of 0h .  After the initial period, 
households can stay in their current residence or they can move.  All homeowners who move 
face transaction costs, tF .    During the first stage, agents must decide between spending on 







t t t t t t t t tc a y T T q F+ ++ − = + − − + −h h                                              (9) 
  
( )1       if  h      














       if  h                         













h                          (11) 
The competitive market rental rate is determined by the financial institutions, which make zero 
profit in equilibrium.  The rental rate covers the depreciation expenditure, property taxes, and 
mortgage interest payments: 
( )m pt t trent r p = + +                                                    (12)                                                  
b. The Second Stage 
All agents retire at the beginning of the second stage and they observe their income, 2ty .  
Agents then make decisions on how much to spend on consumption, tc , and their choice of 
dwelling, 1th + .  Households can stay in their current residence or they can move.  Those who 
purchase another home can choose to borrow against it in the mortgage market or save for the 
next period, 1ta + .  The budget constraint in the second stage is as follows:    
2
1 1 (1 )
i p
t t t t t t t t tc a y r a T T F+ ++ − = + + + − − −h h                                   (13) 
c. The Third Stage 
At the beginning of each period in this stage, agents observe their income, 3ty  and 
unexpected medical bills as a result of a health shock, t .  t  occurs with probability td  which 
takes a value of 1 if the agent receives a health shock and 0 if they do not, and can reoccur each 
period.  Agents must pay for their unexpected medical bills, either from current income, 




tc , and type of preferred dwelling, th , in light of the potential the health shock.  
The third stage budget constraint for a household is: 
3
1 1 (1 )
i p
t t t t t t t t t t tc a y d r a T T F+ ++ − = − + + + − − −h h                                 (14) 
At the end of the third stage agents die, however agents do not know when this will occur. Any 
assets the agent does not consume are distributed as an accidental bequest to the first generation. 
D. Government 
It is assumed that the government has a balanced budget and finances its expenditures, 
tG , 
with tax revenue collected through income and property taxes. 
5. Equilibrium 
Individuals at time t  are heterogeneous with respect to life stages 
ts , assets/mortgages ta
,housing 
th , and income ty .  Let ( , ')e e be the transition matrix for labor income; ( , ')s s be the 
transition matrix for life stages; ( ')s   be age dependent probability of a health shock; t
represent the state ( , , , )s a h y faced by an agent at time t ; and ( )tV  be the maximized value of 
the objective function at state t .  The dynamic programming problem faced by individuals is 
given by: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1
, ', '
' ' '
max , ( , ') ( , ') ( ') 'st t
c h m
s e
V u c h s s e e V

   + = +                     (15) 
subject to the constraints (2)-(14). 
 A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of value functions ( )tV  ; individual decision 
rules for consumption goods, housing, and mortgages; a measure of agent types ( )t  ; and the 
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price of housing 















 are given – so that for all t : 
▪ Given the price of the house, interest rates on mortgages and deposits, and the 
government policy, the dynamic programming problem is solved by the individual’s 
decision rules. 
▪ 
tp clears the housing market, ( ) ( )t th H   = , where ( )th  is the optimal housing 
allocation resulting from the dynamic programming problem of the household. 
▪ Accidental bequests are given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
3 , ;
1 1t t t tm h a
t s
t t










                    (16) 
Death occurs (with probability 
3 ) after agents in the third stage have made their 
homeownership, mortgage, and savings decisions. 
6. Calibration9 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
The goal for the benchmark economy is to match the housing market of Americans aged 
55 and older using data from the HRS.  A summary of all the parameters used in the model can 
be found in Table 1.   
                                                 
9 The MATLAB code used by Imrohoroglu, Matoba, and Tuzel (2018), available at 
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mac.20160327, was very helpful and parts of their code 




In each life stage, s , agents face a probability 
s  of moving to life stage 1s+ . s  is set 
so that on average, agents spend ten years in the first stage and six years in the last two life 
stages.  This makes the average life expectancy 77 years.  The transition matrix for life stages is: 
    
.90 .10 .00








                                                           (17) 
The labor income process that is used in the model is calibrated in such a way so the 
output from the model match homeownership rates of the HRS (future use of calibrated is 
assumed for the same purpose).  The idiosyncratic component of labor income, 1t t te e −= + , is 
calibrated using the four-state Markov chain found in Imrohoroglu, Matoba, and Tuzel (2018).  
The values of te  are (-0.41, -0.10,0.10,0.41) and the transition matrix is: 
.84 .16 .00 .00
.16 .64 .20 .00
( , ')
.00 .20 .64 .16








                                                  (18) 
The tax function in equation 4 is calibrated to the US federal tax code.  
1
 determines the 
progressivity of taxes and is estimated by Gouveia and Strauss (1994) to take the value of 0.768.  
They also estimate 
0
  to be 0.258.  
2
 is calibrated to be 0.5.  Property tax rates in the US vary 
between 0.28 percent (Hawaii) to 2.38 percent (New Jersey) (Walczak 2015), so 
p is set in the 
middle at 1.0 percent.   
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The interest rate on mortgages, mr , is set to 4.05 percent10 and the interest rate on 
deposits, dr , is set to 1.7 percent.11  The transaction cost of selling a home,  , is 10 percent.  
This is slightly higher than what is seen in other studies modeling the entire life-cycle, but there 
is some evidence to suggest that transaction costs are higher for older households (Venti and 
Wise 1990; Ai et al. 1990; Borsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou, and Kotlikoff 1992; Feinstein and 
McFadden 1989).  Following Imrohoroglu, Matoba, and Tuzel (2018), the maximum loan-to-
value parameter,  , is set to 80 percent.  The depreciation rate,  , is set to 1.7 percent.12 
The time period, t , is one year.  The subjective time discount factor,  , is assumed to be 
0.96, a value in line with what is commonly used in the literature.  The 2016 Consumer 
Expenditure Survey shows that non-housing consumption makes up 66.4 percent of a 
household’s personal expenditure (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018), so the relative weight of 
consumption and housing,  , is set at 0.66.  This paper takes a slightly different approach to risk 
aversion than typically seen in these types of models due to its specific focus on retirees and near 
retirees.  Risk Aversion, 
s , takes the value of 5.0 in the first stage, 8.0 in the second stage, and 
10.0 in the third stage.  These rates are higher than what is traditionally found in the literature 
and increasing with age.  It is intentionally calibrated this way as the model does not simulate the 
entire life cycle – only late working years and retirement and older individuals tend to have 
higher degrees of risk aversion than working age individuals (Tymula et al. 2013; Ablert and 
Duffy 2012).   
                                                 
10 The average rate on a 30-year fixed mortgage is 4.05 percent between 2010-2017 (Freddie Mac 2018)  
11 The average one-year treasury rate from 2010-2017 is 0.38 percent (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System 2018).  However, this is a period of Quantitative Easing (QE).  Since low interest rates will 
not be the norm in the future, this paper uses the interest rate on deposits from Imrohoroglu, Matoba, and 
Tuzel (2018), the expected standard as QE ends 
12 The range of   is between 1.5 and 2.0 percent in De Nardi (2004), Imrohoroglu, Matoba, and Tuzel 
(2018), and Nakajima and Telyukova (2017) 
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I find that within the HRS for households aged 72-77, between 40-45 percent of 
household’s report having a bad health as well as an increase in out-of-pocket medical expenses.  
To determine bad health, I considered three metrics from the HRs: households that reported an 
increase in health conditions, households that reported bad health, and households that reported 
cancer, a stroke, lung disease, or heart disease   Therefore, the probability of receiving a health 
shock, 
td , in each period is set to 40 percent when agents are in the third stage and 0 percent 
otherwise and the value of out-of-pocket medical bills, 
t , is set to 0.75.  A sensitivity analysis 
in section 7 explores what happens to the model with higher and lower values 
t .  
The housing grid is based on the square footage for homeowners and renters from the US 
Census Bureau, American Housing Survey 2017.  Renters can choose between two house sizes: 
{1.00,1.25}renth = (a value of 1.00 can be interpreted as 1,000 square feet).  Owners can choose 
between four house sizes: {1.75,2.25,3.00,3.50}ownh = .  The average house size is set to 2.25.   
 The state variables in the dynamic programing problem consist of life stages ts , net 
assets (savings and mortgage) ta , housing th , and employment state te .  There are 3 grid points 
for life stages, 76 grid points for assets (-9.9 to 3.6), 6 grid points for housing (1 to 3.50), and 4 
values for idiosyncratic income.  This results in 5,472 possible state combinations in the model.   
7.  Results 
In this section, I use the benchmark model to investigate whether Americans age 55 and 
older are using their house as a form of precautionary savings by simulating the housing choices 
made by this demographic.  First, I simulate the benchmark model where individuals are aware 
that their health could change in the future, and they will be forced to pay out-of-pocket medical 
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bills.  I then simulate a model eliminating the health shock to determine how this population 
makes housing decisions in its absence. 
To solve for the steady state decision rules in the economy, I begin by guessing the house 
price and solving the decision rules using value function iteration.  After each iteration, I 
compare aggregate housing demand to aggregate housing supply.  The house price is updated, 
and this process is repeated until aggregate housing demand is equal to aggregate housing 
supply.  Using these decision rules, I simulate an economy with 10,000 individuals for 3,750 
periods and generate aggregate statistics for the economy.  I discard the first 750 periods to avoid 
any issues with initial conditions.   
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
To assess the validity of the model, I compare homeownership rates in the benchmark 
model with a health shock to those in the HRS.  Table 2 shows the results of the model compared 
to the HRS.  The model generates an average homeownership rate of 78.1 percent compared with 
77.8 percent in the HRS.  The model also does a reasonable job of approximating 
homeownership rates for each stage of life which was the main target to match in the calibration.  
Table 4 also shows the percent of agents who moved compared to the data.  Moving rates are 
close but slightly lower than what is seen in the data.  The baseline model generates average 
moving rate of 9.1 percent compared to 10.7 percent seen in the HRS. 
A. Economies with and without a Potential Health Shock 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Table 3 presents the results from the simulation of the benchmark economy and a 
counterfactual economy where agents are not subject to out-of-pocket medical expenses.  If 
agents know that they will not receive a health shock, average homeownership rates are 70.7 
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percent (compared to 78.1 percent when a health-shock is possible).  The counterfactual model 
shows almost a 6-percentage point decrease in the number of households that own a home in 
their late working years (stage 1) compared to the benchmark model.  When households retire 
(stage 2), the percent of households who own is almost 4-percentage points lower and the rate of 
moving is 1-percentage point higher in the counterfactual model.  In addition, there is a 1-
percentage point increase in the percent of homeowners who move and downsize.  In late 
retirement (stage 3), homeownership rates are 13-percentage points lower when there is no health 
shock and moving rates are 1.2-percentage points higher.  There is also a 1.8-percentage point 
increase in the rate of homeowners who move to renting.  In both retirement stages, households 
are more likely to move from owning to renting and more likely to downsize when moving in the 
counterfactual model compared to the benchmark model. 
   Since fewer households choose to own a home and those that move are more likely to 
either downsize or rent when an increase households know they will not face an increase in out-
of-pocket medical expenses, this suggests that more older households would prefer to use their 
housing equity to help finance consumption but fear they might need to sell it if they get sick in 
the future.  This provides evidence that households are engaging in precautionary savings using 
the home.          
B. Insurance Policy 
The fact that households are more likely to behave in accordance with the LCH when 
they know there is no possibility of future out-of-pocket medical expenses suggests that the 
existing health insurance market for seniors is incomplete.  As an experiment, I will incorporate 
an insurance policy, that goes beyond what is currently covered by Medicare and supplemental 
coverage, to determine its impact on homeownership decisions of older Americans. 
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Individuals can choose to purchase insurance that would cover all out-of-pocket medical 
expenses.  The cost of insurance is  , a fraction of individual income.  Here, if an individual 
chooses to purchase such a policy, then 1t = ; and if they choose not to purchase the policy, 
0t = .  With this insurance policy, tI , available, the budget constraint faced by agents in the 
model becomes: 
1 1 (1 )
s i p
t t t t t t t t t t t t t tc a y d I r a T T F + ++ − = − − + + + − − −h h                   (19) 
where,  
 if  1  












                                                        (20) 
An agent who purchases insurance might still get sick, however they will not be forced to pay 
medical bills out of their income, savings, or by selling their house.  It will be covered by the 
insurance policy.  So, the health shock 
t  becomes: 
 
 if =0










                                                                   (21) 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
The goal of this experiment was to determine what the price of insurance would so the output of 
the benchmark economy with insurance matched the output of the counterfactual economy.  If 
0.04 = , 12.8 percent of households purchase the insurance. With the insurance policy 
available, homeownership and moving rates become very similar to the counterfactual model 
where there are no health shocks.  Table 4 compares the output of the benchmark model with 
insurance where 0.04 = to the output of the counterfactual model.  This provides evidence that 
with the proper insurance coverage in their later years, Americans age 55 and older would be 
more willing to use the equity in their homes which is demonstrated by an increased likelihood 
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of moving from owning to renting and downsizing. Thus, more individuals act in a manner that 
would be expected by the LCH if they knew all future medical expenses would be covered. 
8. Sensitivity Analysis  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
This section provides a sensitivity analysis to the results of the calibration, which are  
shown in Table 5.  First, I evaluate the impact of higher and lower values of possible out-of- 
pocket medical expenses, 
t .  Lowering t  to 0.25 from 0.75 results in a decrease in the rate of 
homeownership to 71.6 percent compared with 78.1 percent in the benchmark model.  Also, this 
results in an increase in the rate of moving to 10.2 percent from 9.1 percent.  Increasing  
t  to 
1.25 yields the opposite effect.  The rate of homeownership increases to 95.3 percent and the rate 
of moving decreases to 7.6 percent.  This provides further evidence that Americans aged 55 and 
older are engaging in precautionary savings where they would sell their house to pay for possible 
future medical bills.  The higher the cost of medical bills from a potential health shock, t , an 
increasing number of households stay in their home late into retirement and a decreasing number 
move.  The higher the potential medical bills, the more likely households are to stay in their 
home in case they need to sell it to offset these costs. 
 Additionally, I evaluate the impact of transaction costs on the model by comparing a 
model without transaction costs to the benchmark model.  When households do not have to pay 
transaction costs, it has a minimal impact on the distribution of homeownership rates in each 
stage, however, there is an increase in the rate of moving in each stage.  While this is not 
something I set out to investigate in this paper, several studies have proposed this as one possible 
explanation for why older households do not use their housing equity (Venti and Wise 1990; Ai 
et al. 1990; Borsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou, and Kotlikoff 1992; Feinstein and McFadden 1989).  
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Since the rate at which current homeowners move increases compared to the benchmark 
economy, this may provide some evidence that high transaction costs are keeping some 
Americans age 55 and older in their home when they otherwise might move . 
9. Conclusions 
 In this paper, using an economy populated with overlapping generations of heterogeneous 
agents, I examine how homeowners are engaging in precautionary savings using their house to 
pay for potential future medical bills, rather than using its equity toward consumption in 
retirement.  It appears that due to gaps in health insurance that exist for retirees, a significant 
number of Americans appear to own a house well into retirement to offset the costs of possible 
future out-of-pocket medical bills.  In a counterfactual economy where individual’s do not face 
out-of-pocket medical expenses, there is a 13-percentage point decrease in the number of 
homeowners compared to the benchmark model where potential health shocks are a factor.  
Additionally, there is an increase in the percent of homeowners who move from owning to 
renting and downsize.  These are ways in which households can extract equity from their house.  
Evidence that homeowners engaging in precautionary savings using their house is further 
reinforced as the more money that households might have to spend for potential increases in 
medical bills leads to an increase in the number of Americans age 55 and older who own homes. 
 Using this framework, I explore what would happen if seniors had access to health 
insurance that covered all their out-of-pocket medical expenses in their late retirement years, so 
individuals do not need to engage in precautionary savings.  I show that if the cost of such a 
policy is four percent of household income, then 12.8 percent of households will purchase it.  
Agents may still receive a health shock, but they will not be forced to pay for it from their 
income, savings, or selling their house.  The two model economies in this study – the one where 
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agents face a potential health shock and the one where they do not – exhibit similar rates of 
homeownership and moving when the insurance policy is available.  This shows that with more 
adequate health insurance coverage for seniors, households will be more likely to use the equity 
in their house to increase consumption in retirement which is what would be expected per the 
Life Cycle Hypothesis. 
 There are other important and interesting questions related to housing equity and 
precautionary savings that I did not explore in this paper.  Future research should seek to 
investigate the impact of local and state policies on how Americans age 55 and older make 
housing decisions.  Also, the impact of changes to reverse mortgages and changes to the way 
they are administered could allow homeowners to use the equity in their home without moving to 
cover out-of-pocket medical expenses is left to future research.  Finally, extending this model to 
include altruism and bequeathing the house would provide additional insights as to why older 
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Parameter Description Value Source 
p  Property Tax Rate 1.0% Walczak (2015) 
dr  Interest Rate for Deposits 1.7% Imrohoroglu et al. (2018) 
mr  Interest Rate for Mortgages 4.05% Freddie Mac (2018) 
  Transaction Cost of Selling a Home 10.0% Calibrated 
  Maximum Loan-to-Value 80% Imrohoroglu et al. (2018) 
0
  Income Tax Parameter 0.258 Gouveia and Strauss (1994) 
1
  Income Tax Parameter 0.768 Gouveia and Strauss (1994) 
2
  Income Tax Parameter 0.50 Calibrated 
  Relative Weight of c in Utility 0.66 Bureau of Labor Statistics (2016) 
  Relative Risk Aversion 5.0, 8.0, 10.0 Calibrated – Albert and Duffy (2012), Tymula et al. (2013) 
  Housing Depreciation Rate 1.7% De Nardi (2004), Imrohoroglu et al. (2018) 
  Time Discount Factor 0.96 Common in literature 
sw  Wage Profile 2.5, 2.2, 1.7 Calibrated 
t  Health Shock to Income 0.75 Calibrated 
td  Probability of Health Shock 0.40 Health and Retirement Study 









 Percent First Stage Second Stage Third Stage 
Own a House    
     Model 76.0 81.3 72.8 
     HRS Data 76.0 80.4 78.9 
Move    
     Model 11.2 7.4 7.2 





    Economy 
   Percent Health Shock No Health Shock  
Stage 1 
Own 79.2 73.3 
Move 11.2 12.1 
Move Own to Rent 1.6 2.2 
Move and Downsize 3.5 3.7 
Stage 2 
Own 81.3 77.5 
Move 7.4 8.3 
Move Own to Rent 1.0 1.0 
Move and Downsize 2.8 3.8 
Stage 3 
Own 72.8 59.7 
Move 7.2 8.4 
Move Own to Rent 1.8 3.6 
Move and Downsize  3.1 3.3 
Overall 
Own 78.1 70.7 






Table 2.  Model Fit vs HRS Data  




   Percent 
No Health 
Shock 
 Health Shock with 
Insurance 
Stage 1 
Own 73.3 72.7 
Move 12.1 12.1 
Move Own to Rent 2.2 2.2 
Move and Downsize 3.7 3.7 
Stage 2 
Own 77.5 76.8 
Move 8.3 8.4 
Move Own to Rent 1.0 1.0 
Move and Downsize 3.8 3.8 
Stage 3 
Own 59.7 59.6 
Move 8.4 9.1 
Move Own to Rent 3.6 3.5 
Move and Downsize  3.3 3.2 
Total 
Own 70.7 70.2 
Move 10.1 10.3 
Percent Bought Insurance 0.0 12.8 
Notes: Price of insurance policy is 4.0% of household income  
 
   Percent 





Own 79.2 73.9 94.7 79.6 
Move 11.2 12.2 9.6 14.4 
Move Own to Rent 1.6 2.2 0.7 1.6 
Move and Downsize 3.5 3.7 3.2 6.7 
Stage 2 
Own 81.3 77.6 95.5 82.0 
Move 7.4 8.2 6.8 11.1 
Move Own to Rent 1.0 0.9 0.3 0.7 
Move and Downsize 2.8 3.6 3.4 6.3 
Stage 3 
Own 72.8 61.8 96.0 73.0 
Move 7.2 8.8 5.3 11.0 
Move Own to Rent 1.8 3.2 0.1 1.9 
Move and Downsize  3.1 3.0 3.9 6.3 
Overall 
Own 78.1 71.6 95.3 78.4 
Move 9.1 10.2 7.6 12.6 
Notes: t = 0.75 in the benchmark economy, 0.25 for low t , and 1.25 for high t   
Table 4.  Homeownership and Moving Rates with the Insurance Policy 




 Home Maintenance and Housing Disinvestment among Older Americans 
Abstract: Understanding why Americans do not use their housing equity in retirement has been 
the focus of extensive research.  There has been some evidence to suggest that homes owned by 
older Americas appreciate at a slower rate than younger households and that this might be due in 
part to a decrease in spending on maintenance.  Using the Health and Retirement Study, this paper 
builds on previous research by showing that the time older homeowners spend performing 
maintenance themselves is important to consider alongside spending when looking at how much 
older homeowners are reducing their investment in maintenance.  Households disinvest as much 
as $43,000 between the ages of 65-84 by decreasing time and spending on maintenance, which 
amounts to around $2,150 annually that could be used to increase consumption spending in 
retirement.  Failing to account for the value of time spent on home maintenance would lead to a 
30 percent understatement of the true value of disinvestment.  While this is a significant amount 
of money disinvested from the home, questions arise as to why other alternatives, such as a reverse 
mortgage, that yield even more money towards potential retirement use, are not pursued more 
often. 


















1.  Introduction 
 
 It is well established that Americans 65 and older tend to hold on to large amounts of 
housing equity throughout their retirement.  According to the US Census Bureau (2018), 
approximately 80 percent of Americans age 65 and older owned a home, Li and Goodman 
(2016) found the average net worth of houses owned by retirees to be around $200,000 in 2015.  
This accounts for nearly half the net worth of retired Americans (Moulton et al. 2016).  The Life-
Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) suggests that households are net savers during their working years and 
draw down those savings in retirement to smooth consumption (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954). 
Thus, households should draw down their housing equity in retirement.  However, this is not 
often the case, as many households do not decrease housing equity except in the case of divorce 
or death of a spouse. (Borsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou, and Kotlikoff 1992; Ai et al. 1990; Feinstein 
and McFadden 1989; Fisher et al. 2007; Poterba, Venti, and Wise 2011; Venti and Wise 1989, 
1990, 2001, 2004).  Thus, many individuals die retaining large amounts of housing equity. 
Retired homeowners could extract housing equity by moving and downsizing or renting; 
however, most retirees prefer to stay in their current home throughout retirement (Venti and 
Wise 2004; American Association of Retired Persons 1996; Munnell, Soto, and Aubry 2007).  
This is reflected in exceptionally low moving rates for retirees ranging from 1.7 to 9.1 percent 
per year, half of which is households upsizing (Venti and Wise 1989, 1990, 2001, 2004; 
Feinstein and McFadden 1989; Murray 2019).  Since most households want to remain in their 
home, they could gradually extract housing equity through financial instruments like a reverse 
mortgage.  However, there is little evidence to suggest this is a popular mechanism for most 




 This paper examines the possibility that households do extract housing equity while 
remaining in their home by the reallocation of time and resources to housing maintenance.  If left 
alone, a house will depreciate as foundations crack, roofs leak, paint peals, pipes burst, and 
durable goods become obsolete.  It is possible that households extract equity from their homes by 
changing how much they invest in the upkeep of their house.  This was first proposed by 
Feinstein and McFadden (1989).  Older households tend to spend around $900-$1400 per year 
less than the average household on home maintenance (Begley and Lambie-Hanson 2015; 
Davidoff 2006; Gyourko and Tracy 2006; Haughwout, Sutherland, and Tracy 2013; Fisher and 
Williams 2011).  As a result, households age 75 and older see their homes appreciate 1.0-3.6 
percent slower relative to working and middle-aged households (Davidoff 2006; Rodda and 
Patrabansh 2007). 
 Nevertheless, using total expenditure on housing maintenance may be a poor measure of 
actual investment in the home.  Becker (1964) shows that older adults substitute goods-intensive 
food production with time-intensive production.  This could be the case with housing 
maintenance as well.  Failing to account for the how older adults use time in retirement provides 
an incomplete picture of their housing investment decisions.  Aguiar and Hurst (2005) show that 
a decrease in food expenditure is offset by an increase in home production of food.  Therefore, it 
is possible that a decrease in maintenance expenditure in retirement may be offset by more time 
being spent maintaining and improving the home. If this is the case, then housing wealth is not 
being extracted due to lack of maintenance; and the slower rate of home appreciation is a product 
of other observed and unobserved differences between older and younger homeowners. 
 However, if older households are allotting less time to housing maintenance while 
simultaneously reducing their expenditure, then the previous studies underreport the true value of 
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home disinvestment.  Thus, depending on the valuation of time devoted to maintaining one’s 
own home, forgoing home maintenance might provide an even better explanation as to how 
some households that opt to remain in place may act more in accordance with the LCH than 
previously thought. 
 In a preview of the results,  we see that homes owned by those 75 and older appreciate 
1.5-1.9 percent less annually than younger households, which is consistent with the findings of 
Rodda and Patrabansh (2007) and Davidoff (2006).  This study also finds a spike in time spent 
on home maintenance around age 65 as individuals are retiring, but there is a steady decline after 
that with households aged 75 and older spending 18.0-28.3 fewer hours per year on home 
maintenance than younger households.  When including time spent on home maintenance, 
households aged 75 and older spend $1,388-$1,999 less per year than younger households ages 
50 to 74. Failing to account for time spent on home maintenance leads to a 30-52 percent 
understatement of the true dollar value of the decline in maintenance spending.  On average, 
households disinvest almost $43,000 – or around $2,150 annually – between ages 65-84.  This is 
30 percent higher than the corresponding value with use of time excluded.  It is clear that older 
households are extracting housing equity by forgoing investment in home maintenance.  
However, it is not clear if this is the optimal way to do so as other options (e.g., moving and 
annuitizing the proceeds, reverse mortgages, etc.) seem to yield higher annual payouts (Shan 
2011; Butrica and Mudrazija 2016). 
 This paper contributes to the literature by combining the research on the use of housing 
equity by older Americans (see Feinstein and McFadden (1989); Fisher et al. (2007); Hurd 
(1992); Murray (2018, 2019); Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2011); Venti and Wise (1989, 1990, 
2001, 2004) and others) with the research on housing maintenance by the likes of Bogdon 
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(1996); Davidoff (2006); Fisher and Williams (2011); Gyourko and Tracy (2006); Rodda and 
Patrabansh (2007) and others.  The results of this paper suggest that older households may be 
acting more in accordance with the LCH that previously expected as they are extracting housing 
equity by forgoing investment in home maintenance.  While Aguiar and Hurst (2005) find that a 
decrease expenditure on the consumption of food is offset by an increase in the home production 
of food, this results show in this paper find the opposite. Households are not increasing time 
spent on home maintenance and households are forgoing more maintenance than previous 
studies suggest by showing that time spent and expenditure on home maintenance declines as 
individuals age.  This decline in total investment also corresponds to slower appreciation rates 
for older homeowners, possibly providing evidence this is a way in which these households are 
extracting housing equity.  
2.  Data 
 
To fully investigate household expenditures on home maintenance, it is necessary to 
consider both money and time allocated to home improvement.  Failure to account for time 
invested by homeowners potentially ignores an important source of wealth management.  As 
noted in Dunn (2015), there are few data sources that include both expenditure and time use for 
all members of a household.  The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a notable example 
along with its supplement, the Consumption and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS), which is 
administered to a sub-sample of HRS participants. 
The HRS is a longitudinal survey that includes about 20,000 households over age 50, 
representative of the overall United States population in that age group.  The HRS defines an 
observational unit as an eligible household containing at least one person born within a given 
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time period (which varies by phase)1. The HRS is administered by the University of Michigan 
Institute for Social Research in partnership with the RAND Center for the Study of Aging.  The 
original target population for the HRS when the study was initiated in 1992 is adults born 
between 1931-1941 (designated ‘HRS Cohort’) and those born before 1924 (AHEAD cohort).  
Every six years the survey adds a new cohort starting in 1998 with those born between1 924-
1930 (Children of the Depression) and 1942-1947 (War Babies Cohort).  In 2004 those born 
between 1948-1953 (Early Baby Boomers Cohort) were added; and the last group added was in 
2010 with the addition of those born between 1954-1959 (Mid-Baby Boomers Cohort). 
The American Housing Survey is also used for examining home maintenance, however, 
the HRS is unique in its specific focus on Americans aged 50 and older.  The HRS and CAMS 
consider the use of time as well as health when investigating how older Americans choose to 
maintain their home.  Using the restricted version of the HRS provides an opportunity to verify 
the results of other studies using a different sample, as well as add new information other surveys 
cannot provide. 
The sample for this study is restricted to households that continuously reside in a single-
family residence that they own, where the wife is over age 50 in married households and the 
owner is over age 50 in single households2.    This restriction limits households that move at any 
point during the sample period or do not own their house. To ensure that the housing investment 
decision is not being driven by other factors, the sample is limited to either always single or 
always married couples.  Finally, households that include additional members (e.g., parents, 
                                                 
1 For more information on the HRS and its sample selection, see https://hrs.isr.umich.edu/publications/biblio/9047 
(HRS Staff 2008).  




children, etc.) are excluded so the only individuals who derive utility from the home are the 
owners.   
CAMS respondents are asked to report annual household expenditure (for both the 
respondent and the spouse in married households) on materials purchased for home repair and 
expenditure on professional services for maintenance and repair.  In addition, CAMS 
respondents provide the number of monthly hours doing home improvements or home repair.  
Summing the value of time spent on home maintenance with total household expenditure on 
maintenance allows for a complete analysis of the investment decisions of households regarding 
changes in maintenance and upkeep of the home.   
The HRS core survey includes individual and household information on home ownership, 
house values3, money spent on major repairs, income, wealth, health (e.g., cognition and 
mobility), and other household demographic variables that are used in this analysis. All monetary 
values in the HRS and CAMS are reported in nominal dollars and have been converted into 2009 
real dollars using the PCE chain-type price index taken from the Federal Reserve Economic 
Database4.  Some of the HRS and CAMS variables are reported in different time frames (e.g., 
monthly, yearly, biyearly, etc.) and have been converted to annual values.  Descriptive statistics 
of all the variables used in this analysis can be found in Table 1, and a detailed breakdown of all 
the variables used in this analysis can be found in Appendix A. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
                                                 
3 House values in the HRS are subject to input and misreporting errors that can cause large percentage changes 
between years.  To properly analyze house values, changes were made to some of the values.  A detailed breakdown 
of how this was done can be found in Appendix A.  
4 Downloaded from the Federal Reserve Economic Database (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCEPI) on 5/13/2017 
(US Bureau of Economic Analysis). 
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3.  Empirical Strategy   
This study looks at the impact of changes in spending on maintenance, time spent on 
maintenance, and house value as households age.  For the purposes of this study, old age is 
defined as a household over age 75.  Venti and Wise (2001) show this is the age when housing 
equity starts to decline, which is consistent with previous studies investigating this issue 
(Davidoff 2006; Rodda and Patrabansh 2007).    
The first set of regressions estimate the effect of old age on home improvement spending.  
The regressions take the following form: 
0 1 75 'it it it i t itSPENDING AGE X     = + + + + +                                          (1)  
Three measures of spending are used for the dependent variable: (i) spending on maintenance5, 
(ii) spending on major home improvements, and (iii) total household spending.  itX consists of a 
series of demographic controls that include: house value, household income, non-housing wealth, 
an indicator for marital status, an indicator for good mobility, and an indicator for urban status. 
i  is state fixed effects and t  is year fixed effects. An additional set of regressions is also 
estimated and is identical to equation (1), however, dividing the spending metrics by house 
value. 
 The second set of regressions estimate household time spent on home maintenance as 
well as total expenditures to that end, including the dollar value of time.  They take the same 
form as equation (1), but replace itSPENDING  with (i) total household time spent on home 
maintenance and (ii) total investment in home maintenance including the value of time use. 
                                                 
5 Spending on maintenance consists of expenditure on professional services as well as do-it-yourself materials.  
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Davidoff (2006) notes the empirical challenges of examining home maintenance by older 
Americans.  He notes that maintenance may not directly add quality to the home because 
“painting a room…may add nothing to the resale value of one’s home, but fixing a leaky pipe 
almost certainly enhances resale value.”  This makes it difficult to assess whether spending on 
maintenance directly impacts quality of housing.  He suggests a better approach is to determine if 
older households see their houses appreciate more slowly relative to younger households, an 
approach also adopted by Rodda and Patrabansh (2007).  This paper takes a similar approach for 
the final set of regressions which estimate annual appreciation of house value.  These regressions 
take the following form: 
0 1 75 'it it it i t itAPPRECIATION AGE X     = + + + + +                              (2)   
There are two measures used to determine appreciation for the dependent variable: (i) log 
differences and (ii) compounds annual growth rate (CAGR).  Both Davidoff (2006) and Rodda 








                                      (3) 











                                                (4) 
Since the HRS is administered biannually, 2n = for this calculation.  itX includes a series of 
demographic controls that include indicators for race, marital status, urban status, and good 
cognition.  Rodda and Patrabansh (2007) suggest that one possible explanation for older 
households reporting lower appreciation rates could be a lack of awareness of the market and 
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being removed from the buying and selling process.  The HRS includes a variable for total 
cognitive score, which is included in the controls for this purpose. 
4.  Age Profile of Household Investment in Maintenance  
 A. Annual Household Spending on Home Maintenance  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 Figure 1 plots the mean household expenditure on maintenance and major home 
improvements.  Maintenance cost is defined as spending on both professional services and do-it-
yourself materials.  This figure tends to fluctuate around a mean value of $3,000 per year 
between ages 50 and 65.  Spending on major home improvements fluctuates between a mean 
value of $2,000-$3,000 per year between ages 50 and 60, with a spike to around $3,500 per year 
around age 65 as households retire.  Following age 65, there is a clear downward trend in both 
types of home repair and total spending on home investment.  It appears that households increase 
spending on the house just as they are about to retire then slowly decrease spending each year 
after. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 Table 2 shows that mean total household expenditure falls from $4,976 between ages 50-
64 to $3,894 between ages 65-74, a 21.7 percent decline.  This decline is even greater between 
the 65-74 and 75-84 age bracket, falling 28.7 percent to $2,778 per year, and is particularly sharp 
after age 74.  It appears households make initial major improvements and renovations right 
around retirement age in preparation for spending retirement in their home.  Spending on do-it-
yourself materials falling with age is consistent with the findings of Bogdon (1996) and Davidoff 
(2006) and coincides with a decline in time spent on home maintenance with age which is shown 
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in the next section.  Table 3 shows total household expenditure and time invested in maintenance 
by marital status.  Married households spend on average $1,640 more per year on maintenance 
than single households do between the ages of 50-84.     
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 Table 4 presents the regression estimates for spending on maintenance.  Households aged 
75 and older spend between $500-$849 less per year on maintenance6 and $494-$949 less on 
major improvements than younger households.  This amounts to $908-$1,534 less in total 
spending on home maintenance per year.  These estimates are in line with Davidoff (2006) who 
finds households aged 75 and older spend between $644-$1,228 less per year than younger 
households using the American Housing Survey, which asks similar questions to the HRS on 
spending on maintenance, do-it-yourself materials, and major improvements. 
 B.  Annual Household Time Spent on Home Maintenance  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
Figure 2 plots the mean time spent on home maintenance activities for men and women.  
Between ages 50 and 62, time men dedicate to home maintenance tends to fluctuate between 60-
80 hours per year.  This number spikes to between 80-100 hours starting at age 60, as households 
appear to start preparing the home for retirement in their last prime working years.  Following 
age 66, there is a steady decline each year.  Women tend to allocate around 35-40 percent as 
much time as men do on home maintenance.  Between ages 50-70, women spend on average 
between 20-40 hours per year with a steady decline after that. 
 Table 2 shows that the average hours spent on home maintenance by a household 
declines from 80 per year between ages 50-64 to 61 per year between ages 65-75, a 24.2 percent 
                                                 
6 Maintenance is defined as spending on both professional services and do-it-yourself materials. 
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decline.  This decline accelerates between ages 65-74 and 75-84 as annual hours fall 38.5 percent 
to 37 hours.  Home maintenance hours spent by women do not decline starting at age 66 as seen 
with men but have a more consistent profile until after age 74, when women’s hours start to 
decline.  Table 3 shows that married men invest on average 17.8 hours more per year than non-
married men on home maintenance though the decline in hours spent is quicker for married men 
as they age compared to single men.  Married women and single women invest the same number 
of hours on maintaining the home.  Overall, Figure 2 and Tables 2 and 3 show a spike in time 
spent on home maintenance right around retirement age followed by a steady decline.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 Table 5 shows the regression estimates of old age on time spent on home maintenance.  
Households aged 75 and older spend 18.0-28.3 hours less per year on home maintenance than 
younger households do.  The reduction of hours for men after age 75 is slightly more than it is 
for women.  Men aged 75 and older spend 15.6-25.3 less hours per year than younger men and 
women aged 75 and older spend 14.3-17.7 less hours per year than younger women on home 
maintenance.     
C.  Valuating Time Spent on Home Maintenance  
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 The average national cost of a handyman is around $77 per hour7.  Bridgman (2013) 
estimates that an hour or work at home adds around half the value of work in the market to GDP.  
Since home maintenance can be physically taxing and to be conservative, it is assumed that 
individuals are around one-third as productive as skilled labor regardless of gender or age. The 
value of homeowner maintenance is assumed to be $25 per hour.  Figure 3 plots the total dollar 
                                                 
7 According to Home Advisor’s True Cost Guide, https://www.homeadvisor.com/cost/handyman/#closing-article, 
visited on 2/24/19. 
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investment by age when factoring in time spent on home maintenance at $25 per hour.  This 
figure shows the same trends as with time and money spent on home maintenance.  Total 
investment in home maintenance fluctuates between $5,000-$6,000 per year until ages 60-66 
where it spikes to between $6,000-$7,000 per year, with a noticeable decline following age 66.  
Failing to account for the value of time spent on the home causes the value of home investment 
to be understated by $1,000-$1,500 per year. 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 Since it is possible that house value may play a role into how much time and money is 
spent on maintenance, Figure 4 plots total spending and total investment including time divided 
by house value.  Households tend to spend 2.5-3.5 percent of their house value on home 
maintenance prior to retirement age with a spike around age 65, consistent with the previous 
metrics.    Following age 65 there is a decline with households aged 75 and older spending 1.0-
2.5 percent of their house value on home maintenance.  Table 6 shows the regression estimates 
of spending divided by house value.  Households aged 75 and older spend 0.4-0.5 percent of 
their house value less on maintenance per year than younger households.   
D.  Total Value of Disinvestment 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE] 
Table 7 shows mean investment in maintenance by homeowners in their late working 
years as well as their total cumulative spending through age 89.  Households spend $6,144 per 
year between ages 50-64 on total home maintenance and repair when including time spent valued 
at $25 per hour, and spending declines each year after.  This is reflected visually in Figure 5.  
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Table 6 and Figure 5 show what the total level of investment would be if households maintained 
the same level of spending as they did between ages 50-64, compared to what they actually 
spend.  On average, homeowners invest a total of $79,952 in home maintenance and repair 
between the ages of 65-84. This is $42,944 less than they would have spent by maintaining the 
same level of investment they did between ages 50-64, an average of $2,147 per year.  For 
households aged 75 and older, the mean house value is $200,442.  Thus, the mean level of 
disinvestment in maintenance is 19.5 percent of house value.  If the value of time spent on home 
maintenance were not included, the total disinvestment between ages 65-84 would be $33,207, or 
$1,660 per year.  Failing to consider the value of time use leads to a 30 percent understatement of 
the true value of disinvestment in home maintenance.   
[INSERT TABLE  8 HERE] 
 To examine how this level of disinvestment changes with age, Table 8 shows the 
regression results of old age on total home investment and total home investment as a percent of 
house value.  Homeowners aged 75 and older spend between $1,388-$1,999 less per year on total 
home investment than younger households do.  If the value of time was not included, the yearly 
figure would be $465-$478 less than this.  Excluding the value of time spent on home 
maintenance causes the true value of disinvestment by older homeowners to be understated by 
30-52 percent.8  When considering the percent of house value invested on home maintenance, 
older households spend 0.7-0.8 percent less of their house value per year on home maintenance 
than younger households.  Failure to account for the value of time spent on the home leads to a 
0.3 percentage point understatement.   
                                                 
8 Comparing the results from columns 1 and 2 from Table 6 to columns 5 and 6 from Table 2  
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 5.  Appreciation of House Values for Older Americans  
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
 With a clear decline in investment in maintenance as homeowners age, it is important to 
determine if there is also a corresponding change to the value of their house.  This is done by 
comparing the log difference of annual house value and the compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR)9, the results are shown in Table 9.  Log differences show that houses owned by people 
aged 75 and older appreciate between 1.5-1.9 percent less per year those of younger 
homeowners.  These figures are relatively consistent with the 1.8-2.5 percent that Davidoff 
(2006) finds using the American Housing Survey.  The appreciation rate according to CAGR is 
between 0.4-0.5 percent less per year than younger homeowners.  The CAGR estimates are not 
statistically distinguishable from zero, but are somewhat comparable in magnitude to a similar 
specification by Rodda and Patrabansh (2007) who find CAGR for houses owned by people aged 
75 and older to appreciate 0.23 percent less than those owned by younger people in their study 
that also uses the HRS.  The difference is most likely due to a slightly different sample selection 
as well as using data from different waves of the HRS. 
  As mentioned earlier, Davidoff (2006) notes that spending on maintenance may not 
directly impact house value, making it difficult to assess the direct impact of a dollar spent on 
maintenance to changes in house value.  However, the mean appreciation using log differences is 
-2.15 percent between ages 50-74 and -6.15 percent for ages 75 and over.  Homeowners spend 
on average 3.10 percent of their house value on maintenance between ages 50-74 and 2.23 
percent from ages 75 and older, indicating that disinvestment from lack of maintenance sums to 
less than the fall in house values.  While homeowners are forgoing significant investment on 
                                                 
9 Equations 3 and 4 in Section 3 define these metrics 
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maintenance, the amount of disinvestment in maintenance is smaller than the decline in house 
values, similar to the findings of Davidoff (2006).   
6.  Discussion and Conclusions 
 Older households appear to want to remain in their house rather than extract housing 
equity via moving or reverse mortgages, which could lead to higher levels of consumption in 
retirement.  Davidoff (2006) and Fisher and Williams (2011) show that households forgo 
investment in maintenance as they age, however do not account for time spend by the owners on 
home maintenance.  Davidoff (2006) and Rodda and Patrabansh (2007) show that homes of 
those over age 75 appreciate at a slower rate compared to those of younger homeowners.  This 
paper builds on the prior research by pointing to the necessity of including the value of time 
when assessing home maintenance and repair expenditure and that unlike in Aguiar and Hurst 
(2005), time spent on home maintenance does not offset the decline in maintenance expenditure.  
Homeowners tend to increase the amount of money and time they invest into home maintenance 
and repair around age 65 for what appears to be preparation for living there during retirement. 
Following age 65, there is a steady decline in the amount of time and money that gets invested 
into the home.  Households will disinvest an average of $42,944 by forgoing investment in home 
maintenance between the ages of 65-84, amounting to $2,147 per year.  To accompany this 
disinvestment, this study shows that households owned by those aged 75 and older are 
appreciating 1.5-1.9 percent less per year than those owned by younger Americans, suggesting 
that the lack of maintenance is leading to an equity extraction from the home. 
 While homeowners are disinvesting a considerable amount from their home in retirement, 
this may not be the most optimal way to extract equity.  Butrica and Mudrazija (2016) show that 
older households could increase their median income by as much as 40 percent by selling their 
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home and annuitizing the money from the sale.  However, since households seem unwilling to 
relocate, is disinvesting in home maintenance a better source of income than a reverse mortgage?  
Home Equity Conversion Mortgage’s (HECMs) account for 90 percent of reverse mortgages in 
the United States (Nakajima and Telyukova 2017).  One of the more popular ways households 
extract equity through a HECM is through the Tenure plan.  The Tenure plan allows the 
homeowner to receive equal monthly payments the remainder of time in their home (Johnson and 
Simkins 2014; Shan 2011).  This HECM plan is comparable in terms of equity extraction by 
forgoing maintenance for a household that spends the majority of their retirement in the same 
house.  Shan (2011) shows that for a $200,000 house (close to the average house value of the 
HRS sample used for this study), the annual payout for a Tenure plan is between $5,232-$7,32010 
per year for a household that takes out a HECM at age 6511. 
 Given that older homeowners want to stay in their home and the amount of money 
available via a reverse mortgage is more than double what the average household is extracting by 
forgoing maintenance, new questions arise as to the reasons why older homeowners are not using 
reverse mortgages, a sentiment also noted by Davidoff (2006).  One possible explanation is that 
older homeowners do not have the financial literacy to fully comprehend reverse mortgages and 
generally lack awareness of them (Venti and Wise 1990, 2004; Kutty 1998; Davidoff, Gerhard, 
and Post 2017; Kaul and Goodman 2017).  However, one of the primary reasons reverse 
mortgages are not popular is because homeowners say the costs are too high (Moulton et al. 
2016; Redfoot, Scholen, and Brown 2007).  The Moulton study further reports small payouts and 
a desire to be debt-free as other reasons homeowners give for forgoing this option.  These 
explanations are puzzling because by staying in their home and deferring maintenance they will 
                                                 
10 This value varies depending on interest rates 
11 Table 1 in Shan (2011) lays out the proceeds of a hypothetical borrower of a house worth $200,000  
88 
 
be extracting a smaller amount of money from their home.  This gives more plausibility to a lack 
of understanding of what a reverse mortgage is and how it works.  Kaul and Goodman (2017) 
outline some possible changes that would increase the popularity and effectiveness of reverse 
mortgages; however, even in their current state they appear to be a better method of equity 
extraction than forgoing maintenance. 
 Despite more lucrative options available, households are extracting home equity by 
forgoing investment in home repair (in both money and time).  Whether or not this is intentional 
is not clear at this point and worth exploring in the future.  This study shows that the value of 
disinvestment due to decreases in maintenance is higher than previously thought and is an 
important consideration for future studies of this nature.  This study shows that spending on 
home maintenance is not offset by an increase in time spent on home maintenance and that 
households are indeed forgoing maintenance as they age which appears to lead to slower 
appreciation rates for older homeowners.  This provides some evidence to suggest that older 
homeowners are extracting some equity from their home by forgoing maintenance.      
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Maintenance Spending Major Home Improvement Total Spending
Figure 1. Annual Household Spending on Home Maintenance  
Notes: Maintenance is spending on professional services plus spending on do-it-yourself materials.  Total Spending equals spending on maintenance and major 
home improvements.  The line is a local mean smoother that uses the Epanecknikov kernel with a bandwidth of λ=1.  Thus, the local mean for age 60 is the 


























Figure 2. Annual Time Spent on Home Maintenance by Males and Females 
Notes: The line is a local mean smoother that uses the Epanecknikov kernel with a bandwidth of λ=1.  Thus, the local mean for age 60 is the weighted mean for 



























Figure 3. Total Investment into Home Maintenance including Time Valued at $25/hour 
Notes: Total household investment includes maintenance spending (spending on professional services plus spending on do-it-yourself material), home 
improvement spending, and total household time invested valued at $25 per hour.  The line is a local mean smoother that uses the Epanecknikov kernel with a 


































Total Spending Total Investment Including Home Production
Figure 4. Annual Percent of House Value Spent on Maintenance  
Notes: The line is a local mean smoother that uses the Epanecknikov kernel with a bandwidth of λ=1.  Thus, the local mean for age 60 is the weighted mean for 
























65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84
Age
Total Cumulative Expenditure As if Age 50-64 Total Cumulative Expenditure
Figure 5. Total Cumulative Expenditure on Home Maintenance   
Notes: Total cumulative spending assumes that the household invests the same amount each year into home maintenance as they did during their late working 































Figure 6. Annual Appreciation of House Values  
Notes: Log difference = log(Future Value/ Present Value).   
CAGR = compound annual growth rate = (Future Value / Present Value)1/n – 1.  N is the number of years and is equal to 2 since the HRS is a biannual survey.  
The line is a local mean smoother that uses the Epanecknikov kernel with a bandwidth of λ=1.  Thus, the local mean for age 60 is the weighted mean for the 
observations at ages 59, 60, and 61. 
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  Age 
  50-74   75+   All 
  Mean Std Dev   Mean 
Std 
Dev   Mean Std Dev 
Demographics 
Age 66.38 5.41   80.37 4.61   70.98 8.35 
Male 0.49 0.50   0.31 0.46   0.44 0.50 
Female 0.51 0.50   0.69 0.46   0.56 0.50 
Married 0.69 0.46   0.42 0.49   0.60 0.49 
Urban Household 0.77 0.42   0.77 0.42   0.77 0.42 
White 0.82 0.39   0.85 0.36   0.83 0.38 
Black 0.15 0.35   0.12 0.33   0.14 0.35 
Good Mobility 0.77 0.77   0.68 0.47   0.74 0.44 
Good Cognition 0.91 0.29   0.79 0.41   0.86 0.34 
 
Wealth Measures                 
House Value 223,697 237,174   200,442 349,429   216,013 279,508 
Income 70,126 108,148   41,784 56,253   60,818 95,305 
Non-Housing Wealth 384,285 1,088,370   346,541 953,291   371,889 1,046,057 
 
Maintenance Spending                 
Do It Yourself Materials 903.61 2,622   563.64 1,501   801.56 2,348 
Professional Services 1,537 6,074   984.74 2,541   1,370 5,270 
Major Improvements 2,574 9,661   1,591 5,434   2,284 8,644 
Total 4,277 10,963   2,662 5,788   3,801 9,756 
Total / House Value 2.27% 5.18%   1.79% 3.60%   2.13% 4.78% 
 
Time Spent on Maintenance                 
Males 67.19 140.37   45.78 107.20   61.86 133.2 
Females 27.94 84.79   14.78 51.45   24.10 76.81 
Total Household Time 67.38 153.94   34.15 92.05   57.22 138.85 
 
Total Investment 5,255 11,147   3,136 5,958   4,628 9,944 
 
Total Investment / House Value  3.10% 9.40%   2.23% 5.04%   2.84% 8.36% 
 
House Value Appreciation                 
Log Differences -2.15% 34.29%   -6.15% 40.86%   -3.29% 36.34% 
CAGR 0.39% 17.79%   -1.04% 20.72%   -0.02% 18.68% 
                  
Observations 12,408   6,068   18,476 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics   
Notes: CAGR = Compound Annual Growth Rate.  Male and female values for time spent on maintenance represents the average 
time spent by males and the average time spent by females.  Total household time represents the average for the household.  The 
male and female values can be from either single or married households.  Total investment includes maintenance spending plus 





                
  Age 
  50-85   50-64   65-74   75-84 
Household Expenditure               
Do It Yourself Materials 812.27   1,065.37   816.69   558.81 
  (2377.64)   (3235.36)   (2220.10)   (1474.03) 
Professional Services 1,396.63   1,893.79   1,346.97   1,010.88 
  (5378.23)   (7550.71)   (5108.89)   (2611.15) 
Major Improvements 2,343.57   2,904.42   2,393.15   1,685.13 
  (8826.40)   (9106.47)   (9949.07)   (5744.86) 
Total Household Expenditure 3,888.06   4,975.82   3,893.69   2777.59 
  (9957.18)   (11190.35)   (10818.23)   (6124.73) 
Hours Spent on Maintenance               
Males 62.57   75.97   61.77   46.97 
  (134.36   (151.68)   (132.67)   (110.38) 
Females 24.95   29.51   27.06   16.37 
  (78.36)   (77.22)   (88.76)   (55.13) 
Total Household Time 59.22   79.99   60.65   37.31 
  (141.51)   (166.63)   (146.31)   (97.51) 
                






Table 2. Expenditure and Time Allocated to Home Maintenance by Age   
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  Age 
  Married Not Married 
  50-85   50-64   65-74   75-84     50-85   50-64   65-74   75-84 
Household Expenditure                                 
Do It Yourself Materials 951.38   1,175.78   917.24   668.83     592.10   692.69   658.24   464.78 
  (2727.93)   (3575.60)   (2386.61)   (1625.12)     (1672.50)   (1575.02)   (1919.24)   (1325.22) 
Professional Services 1,510.27   1,808.43   1,447.75   1,178.58     1,219.61   2,180.30   1,190.29   870.46 
  (5123.92)   (4917.34)   (5891.93)   (3024.17)     (5748.81)   (12943.53)   (3562.17)   (2198.85) 
Major Improvements 2,823.70   3297.04   2,786.66   2,123.03     1,532.06   1,459.42   1,740.48   1,286.44 
  (10260.26)   (10033.20) (11575.77)   (6563.21)     (5533.51)   (3881.13)   (6346.68)   (4918.51) 
Total Household Expenditure 4,497.78   5,337.66   4,390.08   3355.72     2,857.48   3,644.13   3,070.38   2251.22 
  (11084.59)   (10819.68)   (12521.12)   (6968.62)     (7575.39)   (12382.47)   (7077.59)   (5187.16) 
Hours Spent on Maintenance                                 
Males 64.91   77.58   62.75   50.87     47.15   55.98   55.38   31.69 
  (138.68)   (154.57)   (136.11)   (116.06)     (100.24)   (108.10)   (107.72)   (82.99) 
Females 25.63   29.88   26.06   17.67     25.56   27.82   29.06   14.98 
  (77.40)   (77.73)   (80.36)   (68.75)     (80.25)   (75.00)   (103.62)   (35.16) 
Total Household Time 76.37   92.61   75.24   55.69     28.82   34.73   34.99   18.50 
  (162.39)   (180.71   (163.47)   (125.37)     (85.66)   (85.03)   (105.09)   (49.66) 
                                  






Table 3. Expenditure and Time Allocated to Home Maintenance by Age and Marital Status  
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  Maintenance   Maintenance   
Major 
Improvement   
Major 
Improvement   
Total 
Spending   
Total 
Spending 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
AGE >= 75 -848.754***   -499.750***   -948.613***   -493.828***   -1533.953***   -908.328*** 
  (136.373)   (157.749)   (179.646)   (172.571)   (196.448)   (201.853) 
                        
Observations  5,800   5,430   8,188   7,718   8,188   7,718 
R2 0.021   0.059   0.018   0.057   0.024   0.082 
Year FE YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES 
State FE YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES 
Covariates NO   YES   NO   YES   NO   YES 
Notes: Results presented with robust standard errors.  Controls include house value, income, non-housing wealth, an indicator for marital status, an indicator for 
mobility, and an indicator classifying the household as urban or rural. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
 
                        
  Time   Time   Males   Males   Females   Females 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
AGE >= 75 -28.263***   -17.956***   -25.302***   -15.630**   -17.699***   -14.297*** 
  (3.372)   (3.441)   (7.049)   (7.354)   (3.592)   (3.725) 
                        
Observations  6,456   5,680   2,973   2,758   3,483   3,287 
R2 0.028   0.036   0.036   0.054   0.037   0.063 
Year FE YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES 
State FE YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES 
Covariates NO   YES   NO   YES   NO   YES 
 
 
Table 4. Impact of Age on Home Maintenance Expenditure    
Table 5. Impact of Age on Time Use  
Notes: Results presented with robust standard errors.  Controls include house value, income, non-housing wealth, an indicator for 
marital status, an indicator for mobility, and an indicator classifying the household as urban or rural. 





                        
  Maintenance   Maintenance   
Major 
Improvement   
Major 
Improvement   
Total 
Spending   
Total 
Spending 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
AGE >= 75 -0.002***   -0.002***   -0.004***   -0.003***   -0.005***   -0.004*** 
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
                        
Observations  5,430   5,430   7,718   7,718   7,718   7,718 
R2 0.013   0.022   0.013   0.022   0.016   0.026 
Year FE YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES 
State FE YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES 
Covariates NO   YES   NO   YES   NO   YES 
Notes: Results presented with robust standard errors.  Controls include house value, income, non-housing wealth, an indicator for marital status, an indicator for 















            
  Annual Expenditure  
  Do It Yourself Materials Professional Services Major Improvements   Total   
Mean Investment Ages 50-64 1,065.37 1,893.79 2,904.42 4,975.72   
Cumulative Investment            
Ages 65-69 4,504.78 7,453.98 14,486.95 22,468.36   
Ages 65-74 8,200.41 13,524.64 23,898.82 38,897.99   
Ages 65-79 10,944.09 19,001.17 32,542.03 53,255.20   
Ages 64-84 13,827.71 23,315.09 40,580.35 66,307.61   
  Household Time       
  
Hours/Year Annualized Value ($25/hr) Total Investment 
Total Investment 
 as if 50-64 
Cumulative 
Shortfall 
Mean Investment Ages 50-64 79.99 1,999.70 6,144.81     
Cumulative Investment            
Ages 65-69 368.18 9,204.57 27,709.77 30,724.05 3,014.28 
Ages 65-74 611.35 15,283.68 47,701.90 61,448.10 13,746.20 
Ages 65-79 821.71 20,542.81 65,066.00 92,172.15 27,106.15 







Table 7. Cumulative Investment in Home Maintenance   
Notes: The top row shows the average for households in late working years.  The columns below show the total cumulative spending through that age bracket.  The last column 
shows the difference between the total cumulative investment including time use valued at $25 per hour and what would have been spent had the household continued to invest what 






      
  
        
  Total    Total   
Total 
House Value  
Total 
House Value 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
AGE >= 75 -1999.404***   -1388.230***   -0.008***   -0.007*** 
  (195.372)   (197.183)   (0.001)   (0.002) 
                
Observations  8,722   7,741   8,218   8,218 
R2 0.028   0.077   0.011   0.021 
Year FE YES   YES   YES   YES 
State FE YES   YES   YES   YES 





                
  Log Difference   Log Difference   CAGR   CAGR 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
AGE >= 75 -0.019***   -0.015**   -0.004   -0.005 
  (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.004)   (0.004) 
                
Cognition Score     0.017       -0.010 
      (0.015)       (0.08) 
Observations  14,032   11,629   14,032   11,629 
R2 0.067   0.062   0.062   0.059 
Year FE YES   YES   YES   YES 
State FE YES   YES   YES   YES 






Table 8. Total Investment in Home Maintenance with Time Valued at $25 Per Hour 
Notes: Results presented with robust standard errors.  Controls include house value, income, non-housing wealth, an 
indicator for marital status, and an indicator classifying the household as urban or rural. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
 
Table 9. Appreciation of House Values by Age  
Notes: Results presented with robust standard errors.  Controls include indicators for race, marital 
status, whether the household is classified as urban or rural, and good cognition score. 




Appendix A: Description of Variables 
Variables from the HRS are taken from two sources.  The first is the Enhanced FAT files 
compiled by the RAND Center for the Study of Aging, which compiles the raw data from the 
survey into one file for each wave making it easier to merge with other waves.  The second is 
from the RAND HRS data file.  Developed at RAND with funding from the National Institute on 
Aging and the Social Security Administration, it is a cleaned file containing HRS data from all 
waves of the survey (RAND HRS Data 2016).  RAND takes the raw responses from the HRS –in 
some cases, questions vary across waves – and combine them into a variable that is consistent 
across waves. 
Variable Description 
House Value House Value comes from the RAND HRS file.  Several changes were 
made to this variable by the author.  There are many instances where 
there were incredibly large percent changes in house value between 
waves.  Upon visual inspection, much of this was caused by what 
appears to be input error from the respondent where zeros were left off.  
One example would be, if a respondent reported in 2000 a house value 
of $350,000, then in 2002 a house value of $400, and in 2004 a house 
value of $450,000 – it is most likely the respondent meant $400,000 in 
2002.  A second example would be, if a respondent reported in 2000 a 
house value of $350,000, then in 2002 house value was missing, and in 
2004 a house value of $450,000 but reported owning a home but not 
moving in 2002.  To find and correct as many of these possible errors as 
possible, I searched for percent changes above 100% year over year for 
households that did not move.  I then visually inspected the data looking 
for these types of irregularities and found 564 such cases.  In cases such 
as the first example, the house value was adjusted by adding the 
appropriate number of zeros.  In cases such as the second example, the 
median value between the surrounding years was imputed, so in the 
second example the house value for 2002 would be 
(450,000+350,000)/2 = $400,000.  In cases where a value was reported 
but did not appear to have a clean fix, the household was dropped.  In 
the case where a house value of zero was reported in any wave, the 
household was also dropped.  The households identifying numbers that 




Household Income Household income comes from the RAND HRS file and is a sum of all 
the self-reported income to the household, which includes: individual 
earnings, capital income, pension income, annuity income, social 
security, other government transfers, and other household income. 
Non-Housing Wealth Non-Housing Wealth come from the RAND HRS file and is the sum of 
the self-reported values of real estate excluding the primary residence, 
vehicles, businesses, IRA accounts, stock value, checking accounts, 
checkable deposits, bonds, and other savings minus household debt.  
Spending on Major 
Improvements  
Major Improvement Spending comes from the RAND FAT files.  No 
values were imputed, if they respondent answered with a bracket they 
were treated as missing. 
Spending on Do-It-
Yourself Materials 
Spending on Do-It-Yourself Materials is a CAMS variable. 
Spending on 
Professional Services 
Spending on Professional Services is a CAMS variable. 
Time Spent on Home 
Improvement  
Time Spent on Home Improvement is a CAMS variable. 
Age Age comes from the RAND HRS file.  The household variable for age 
is determined by the age of the female in married households and the 
age of the individual in single households. 
Marital Status Marital Status comes from the RAND HRS file.  This is a dummy 
variable takes a value of 1 if they report they are married and a value of 
0 for any other marital status. 
Gender 
(Male/Female) 
Gender comes from the RAND HRS file. 
Race Race comes from the RAND HRS file. 
Good Mobility Mobility comes from the RAND HRS file and is constructed from the 
variables RwMOBILA and SwMOBILA.  The mobility index is a scale of 
0-5.  If the average for the household is less than 2 then the household is 
considered to have good mobility and this variable takes a value of 1, 
otherwise it takes a value of 0. 
Good Cognition Cognition comes from the Rand HRS file and is constructed from the 
variables RwCOGTOT and SwCOGTOT.  The cognition score is from 0-
35.  If the average for the household is greater than 17 then the 
household is considered to have good cognition and this variable take a 
value of 1, otherwise it takes a value of 0. 
Total Investment Total Investment is a variable that is the sum of Do-It-Yourself 
Materials, Spending on Professional Services, Major Improvement 





 Housing equity accounts for a large portion of many retirees’ savings portfolios yet they 
historically have not used their housing equity to help increase consumption in retirement as 
would be expected per the Life-Cycle Hypothesis.  The findings of this dissertation provide new 
information to help understand why this is the case for some households and examines a 
previously unexplored way in which households are extracting some housing equity by forgoing 
home maintenance.  
Defined benefit plans provide a guaranteed source of income in retirement where 
households bear no risk.  Defined contribution plans potentially carry more risk depending on the 
asset allocation the household chooses.  The guaranteed income from a defined benefit plan may 
have mitigated some of the effects of the Great Recession whereas households with defined 
contribution plans experienced greater losses.  I show in Chapter 1 that households with defined 
contribution plans are 2.1-2.9 percent less likely to own a home in the years following the Great 
Recession compared to households with a defined benefit plan.  It is possible that some 
households with defined contribution plans were willing to forgo homeownership to offset some 
of the losses they experienced during the Great Recession.  This is important because there is no 
guarantee housing prices will always increase in the future they way they did in the decades prior 
to the Great Recession.  Therefore, it is possible that housing equity will carry some risk.  Future 
retirees will also be more likely to have a defined contribution plan instead of a defined benefit 
plan and therefore their savings portfolio has more risk than previous generations of retirees and 
it may be more common for some households to forego homeownership and use that equity to 
increase consumption in retirement. 
Many older households have health insurance through both Medicare and some form of 
supplemental insurance.  However, they still face out-of-pocket medical expenses, particularly if 
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they need long-term care.  As a result it is possible that some households are engaging in 
precautionary savings where they hold on to their house and sell it in the event they need to pay 
for an increase in out-of-pocket medical expenses.  In Chapter 2 I show if retirees had more 
complete health insurance and knew they would not need to pay for an increase in out-of-pocket 
medical expenses, then there would be a 13-percentage point reduction in homeownership after 
the age of 72.  I also show that 12.8 percent of households would be willing to spend 4 percent of 
their income on a health insurance plan that would cover all their out-of-pocket medical 
expenses.  As a result, households do not need to engage in precautionary savings and some 
households chose to forgo homeownership and act more in accordance with what would be 
expected per the Life-Cycle Hypothesis.  Precautionary savings appears to be a reason why some 
households are not extracting housing equity in retirement. 
While Chapters 1 and 2 explore possible reasons why some households choose to stay in 
their house or move, most older homeowners still appear to want to remain in their home during 
retirement.  In Chapter 3, I explore how some older homeowners may be extracting some 
housing equity by forgoing investment into home maintenance. I find that homeowners reduce 
their spending on home maintenance as they age but this is not offset by an increase in time spent 
on home maintenance.  In fact, homeowners reduce the time spent on home maintenance as they 
age.  I find that households aged 75 and older spend 18-28 less hours per year on home 
maintenance compared to households aged 50-72.  This leads to a $1,388-$1,999 decrease in the 
total investment in home maintenance each year for households over the age of 75 compared to 
younger households.  Homes owned by individuals over the age of 75 appreciate 1.5-1.9 percent 
slower each year compared to homes owed by individuals aged 50-74.  I also show that 
households will forgo as much as $43,000 on home maintenance between the ages of 65-84 – 
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this amounts to around $2,150 annually.  The results of this chapter show that time spent by 
older Americans on home maintenance does not offset a decrease in spending on maintenance 
and suggest that forgoing maintenance is a way in which some older homeowners are extracting 
housing equity. 
This dissertation offers new insights into why some older Americans are not using their 
housing equity to increase consumption in retirement as well as shows a previously unexplored 
way in which some older homeowners are extracting housing equity.  This information is 
valuable to both retirees and policymakers as Americas population is aging and people are living 
longer in retirement.  As a result, retirees may face different choices in in the future than many 
retirees of past generations regarding the use of their housing equity in retirement.  Additionally, 
his dissertation helps better understand some of these choices and why households are making 
them.  This information will help future retirees better plan for their retirement and make 
financial decisions.  It also provides valuable information to policymakers as they shape policy 
for the 21st century.   
 
